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DETERMINATION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION
A central issue in modem antitrust litigation has been a deter-
mination of the relevant market. It has only been during the last
two decades that market definition has come to the fore. In that
period a substantial number of cases focused upon a determination
of the relevant market and such determination was often critical
to the court's decision.
The term "market" does not appear in any of the antitrust
laws: it is solely a term of judicial construction. The market concept
was originally developed by the courts in cases concerning whether
a particular business concentration was a monopoly under section
2 of the Sherman Act.1 In order to determine whether monopoly
power for purposes of section 2 exists, a definition of the market
within which it is to be measured is essential, for the distinction
between competition and monopoly turns on power in a relevant
market, i.e., the market within which the monopoly is alleged to
operate. A leading case on market definition under section 2 has
concluded, "The ultimate consideration in such a determination
[whether section 2 has been violated] is whether the defendants
control the price and competition in the market for such part of
trade or commerce as they are charged with monopolizing." 3
The area of primary importance today in market determination
is that of mergers or the acquisition by one corporation of another.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, applies to such acquisi-
tions of stock or assets of another corporation where "the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to
tend to create a monopoly ... in any line of commerce in any
I Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
2 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 44 (1955).
3 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).
(Emphasis added.)
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section of the country." 4 The legal effects of the merger or acquisi-
tion must be tested in some sort of market--"an area of effective
competition." 5 The courts must define "in any line of commerce"
(the product market) and "in any section of the country" (the
geographic market). The Supreme Court has declared, "Determina-
tion of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding
of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly
must be one which will substantially lessen competition 'within the
area of effective competition.'" " The role of the relevant market
in a section 7 case is thus to determine where the competitive effects
shall be evaluated and to determine whether the identifiable com-
petitive effects are substantial enough to produce a significant les-
sening of competition.7
The relevant market has three significant dimensions 8-a prod-
uct dimension, a geographic dimension, and a time dimension. The
scope of the present article will be limited to the product aspects
of the market.' It will also be primarily limited to an analysis of
the product market in cases arising under section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. While these two sections are
the ones of major importance, it should be noted here that there
may also be market definition problems in other areas of the anti-
trust laws, such as section 1 of the Sherman Act,10 the Miller-
4 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). The relevant portion
of section 7 provides that:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
5 See S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950); "Hearings on H.R.
2734 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary," 81st Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 36-46, 66-76, 81-83, 144, 306 (1948-1950).
6 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
7 See Barnes, "The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision," 51
Geo. L. J. 706, 726-27 (1963).
8 There are five dimensions listed in Bock, Mergers and Markets 90 (3d ed.
1964) : 1) product, 2) geographic, 3) functional, 4) time, and 5) unit-of-measurement.
Barnes also states there are five essential dimensions of the relevant market: 1)
product, 2) geographic, 3) time, 4) buyers, and 5) sellers, Barnes, supra note 7, at 728.
9 For discussions on the geographic market see Bock, op. cit. supra note 8, at
111; Colwell, Amended Section Seven of the Clayton Act, Conglomerate Mergers, and
Preventive Antitrust Policy 422 (1963) ; Phillips & Hall, "Merger Litigation, 1951-
1960," 6 Antitrust Bull. 19, 30 (1961) ; Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 580, 594-602 (1954).
For treatment of the time dimension see Bock, op. cit. supra at 134.
10 Section 1 declares as illegal, "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
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Tydings Amendment to section 1,-' the McGuire Act,"2 the Robin-
son-Patman Act,13 and, in an area closely related to section 7,
Conspiracies to restrain trade under section 1 involve such transactions as the fixing
of prices, the allocation of markets, and boycotts, and such practices do not require
any examination of competitive effects. Hence, there is no need for market determina-
tion. See Massel, Competition and Monopoly 262 (1962). However, the Government
may also challenge combinations or mergers as being in restraint of trade. In such
situations a determination of the market similar to that involved under section 2 of
the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act will be required. See, e.g., United
States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964), discussed
later in this article.
11 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
12 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). The Miller-Tydings Amendment
and the McGuire Act permit resale price maintenance by sellers whose products are
"in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced
or distributed by others." Hence, the validity of the price-fixing may turn upon
what products are found to be in the same market with the price-fixed product. See
Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 580, 583 (1954). The outstanding example of the market
problem in this area is Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947). In that case the Kodak Company entered into re-
sale price maintenance agreements covering Kodachrome color films. The issue was
whether or not the agreements were protected by the Miller-Tydings Amendment and
this in turn depended upon whether Kodachrome was "in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class." Kodachrome was color film and there
was no other color film to compete with it. Kodak argued that Kodachrome and black
and white films were in the same market and competed with each other. The court
concluded color film was in a market by itself and did not compete with black and
white film. Therefore, Kodachrome was not in "free and open competition" with
products of the same class and Kodak could not invoke the protection of the Miller-
Tydings Amendment.
13 The relevant portion of the Robinson-Patman Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . .. either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
Although this part of the Robinson-Patman Act includes the phrase "in any
line of commerce," its application "has not involved substantial consideration of
market definition." Massel, Competition and Monopoly 269 (1962). The main reason
for this appears to be a refusal on the part of the Federal Trade Commission and the
courts to embark on a substantial consideration of competitive effects.
By and large, the concept of injury to competition under the act has been
less complicated-perhaps less meaningful-than the concepts applied in other
antitrust fields. There has been little economic inquiry into effects on compe-
tition, either past or potential. For the most part, it was presumed that any
price discrimination would injure competition .... Given this orientation,
there has been no need to struggle with market concepts.
Id. at 269. Compare Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 580, 583 (1954).
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section 3 of the Clayton Act.14
14 The pertinent portion of § 3 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of . .. competitors of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such con-
dition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
The section thus condemns "exclusive dealing" arrangements when there is a
lessening of competition or a tendency toward monopoly "in any line of commerce"
Hence, it would seem that a definition of a relevant market, i.e., the "line of com-
merce," and an analysis of the competitive effects in that market would be vital in
a § 3 case. However, the early Supreme Court decisions did not emphasize the
determination of a well-defined relevant market and did not undertake extensive
examination of the competitive effects in the "line of commerce." Note, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 580, 583 (1954). See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; Fashion Ori-
ginators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936) ; International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298
t,U.S. 131 (1936); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); FTC v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923) ; United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258
U.S. 451 (1922); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346
(1922). For an individual treatment of these cases see generally Note, "Exclusive
Dealing Arrangements Under the Anti-trust Laws," 47 Va. L. Rev. 675 (1961).
In 1961 the Supreme Court for the first time emphasized the importance of the
relevant market in a § 3 case, especially in regard to the geographic market. In
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), the Court's determina-
tion that a requirements contract did not violate section 3 turned on a definition of
the relevant geographical market. The contract provided that a coal company would
supply all the fuel (coal) requirements of a new generating plant of an electric utility
company for a period of twenty years. The Court held that competitive effects were
to be measured within a relevant market and broadly defined the geographical market
so that less than 1% of the market was foreclosed by the contract in question. The
Court emphasized the importance of both the product and geographic markets in
§ 3 cases when it stated that two of the three determinations vital to finding a
violation of the section are: "First, the line of commerce. . . . Second, the area of
effective competition.
* . ." 365 U.S. 320, 327. The Court criticized the lower courts for not considering
the relevant market and went on to hold that "the relevant market is the prime
factor in relation to which the ultimate question, whether the contract forecloses
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce involved, must be decided"
365 U.S. at 329. Thus it appears that both the product and geographical dimensions
of the relevant market will be increasingly important in § 3 cases.
For more detailed discussions of § 3 and Tampa Electric see generally Martin,
Mergers and the Clayton Act 273 (1959); Massel, Competition and Monopoly
270 (1962); Bok, "The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrange-
ments Under the Clayton Act," 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267 (1961); Handler, "Annual
Review of Antitrust Developments," 16 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 385, 393 (1961);
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The importance of determining the product market reached
a peak in 1964 with the United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer-
ica :1 and the United States v. Continental Can Co.' decisions.
Both cases were brought under section 7 and both used a product
market definition to find violations of the section. In order to appre-
ciate the significance of these recent cases, it will be necessary to
explore the prior developments concerning product market defini-
tion under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
II. TaE SHERMAN AcT
A. Thre production flexibility doctrine
One of the earliest cases in which the Supreme Court had the
occasion extensively to consider product market determination was
United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,17 decided in 1948. This was
a merger case in which a sharply divided Court upheld the chal-
lenged acquisition as not being violative of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. United States Steel, a producer of rolled steel prod-
ucts, acquired Consolidated Steel, a fabricator of certain rolled
steel products. There are several types of rolled steel products, such
as steel plates, shapes, sheets, bars, etc. Consolidated was mainly
engaged in purchasing steel plates and shapes and fabricating them
into finished steel products. It appeared from the evidence that one
of U. S. Steel's purposes in purchasing Consolidated was to assure
a market for the plates and shapes produced by one of its plants.'8
The Government attacked this vertical aspect ' of the merger upon
the theory that it would restrain trade by precluding competitors
Palley, "Antitrust Pitfalls in Exclusive Dealing-Recent Developments Under the
Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts," 37 Notre Dame Law. 499 (1962); "The Supreme
Court, 1960 Term," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 202 (1961); Comment, 59 Mich. L. Rev.
1236 (1961) ; Casenotes, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (1962) ; 22 La. L. Rev. 270 (1961),
39 Texas L. Rev. 913 (1961) ; 15 Vand. L. Rev. 617 (1962).
15 377 U.S. 271 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Alcoa-Rome Cable.]
16 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
'7 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
is Id. at 506.
19 There are generally considered to be three types of mergers: horizontal, ver-
tical, and conglomerate. A horizontal merger is one between two competing com-
panies. A vertical merger is one "between companies standing in a supplier-customer
relationship." United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 321, 323. "Conglomerate
merger" is rather difficult to define but has generally been thought to refer to a merger
between two companies engaged in dissimilar businesses. For more complete defini-
tions see Day, "Conglomerate Mergers and 'The Curse of Bigness,"' 42 N.C.L.
Rev. 511, 517-20 (1964).
There were also horizontal aspects to the Columbia Steel decision since both
Consolidated and U.S. Steel were involved in structural steel fabrication and in the
manufacture of pipe. 334 U.S. at 527.
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of U. S. Steel from supplying Consolidated's needs of plates and
shapes. The Government argued that the relevant product market
in which to analyze the effects of this merger should consist of only
plates and shapes while the defendants maintained that the market
should encompass all rolled steel products. This issue was a crucial
one, for if plates and shapes were the product market Consolidated
would account for thirteen per cent of the consumption of products
in the relevant geographical market and this substantial share of
the market would be foreclosed to the competitors of U. S. Steel
by the challenged acquisition. If, on the other hand, the product
market were to consist of all rolled steel products, Consolidated's
share of this market would be three per cent and only a minor
market foreclosure would occur. Mr. Justice Reed, writing for the
5-4 majority, held the relevant product market consisted of all
rolled steel products. Justice Reed's market definition was a pro-
ducer-oriented one. He relied upon evidence that it was possible
for rolled steel producers to make other products interchangeably
with plates and shapes and, therefore, "the effect of the removal
of Consolidated's demand for plates and shapes must be measured
not against the market for plates and shapes alone, but for all com-
parable rolled products." 20 The record did not show any actual
production shifts by rolled steel producers and Justice Reed appar-
ently based his determinations on the technological feasibility of
such shifts.21 Mr. Justice Douglas for the dissenters felt that a better
market definition would be one that considered "the actual business
of which competitors will be deprived," 22 i.e., Consolidated's pur-
chases of plates and shapes.
Justice Reed's production flexibility concept has not received
wide acceptance as a reasonable product market test.2 3 The major
criticism of this concept is that in Columbia Steel the Court con-
sidered only the technological possibility of production shifts rather
than whether such shifts occurred in actual practice. A second
major criticism is that this test focuses upon the producers and
20 334 U.S. at 510.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 538-39. Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Murphy, and Rutledge,
launched an attack on the problem of bigness. He felt that "size in steel is the measure
of the power of a handful of men over our economy." Id. at 536. The interesting facet
of this dissent is that in 1948 Justice Douglas was foreshadowing what was to become
the majority view of the Supreme Court in the 1960's-bigness is bad. "The least I
can say is that a company that has . . . tremendous leverage on our economy is big
enough." Id. at 540.
23 See Bock, op. cit. supra note 8; Note, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861 (1962). Contra,
Mann & Lewyn, "The Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two
New Cases-Two Different Views," 47 Va. L. Rev. 1014 (1961).
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ignores the consumers. The validity of this second criticism of
course depends upon whether the interests to be protected by the
antitrust laws are those of the competitors or those of the consum-
ers. It has been suggested that if the protection of competitors is
to be the goal in preventing vertical mergers, then considering
production flexibility would appear to be justifiable.24 It should
also be noted that even if protection of competitors is the desired
objective, the production flexibility doctrine may still be criti-
cized as not providing enough protection since the competitors will
be forced into producing new lines and entering new markets.
The production flexibility test as developed in Columbia Steel
has been rejected by the lower courts in at least four cases aris-
ing under section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 5 These courts indicated
production flexibility was not a proper test in a section 7 pro-
ceeding and rejected it on the basis that no actual shifts in pro-
duction were shown. It was also condemned as a test considering
only the sellers and ignoring the buyers.2 6 It seems questionable
whether the production flexibility doctrine would be accepted in
a Sherman Act case today.
Although production flexibility seems now to be rejected as a
market test in and of itself, it still may have some significance when
24 Mann & Lewyn, supra at 1027. The authors also indicate production flexibility
is relevant in horizontal mergers where an injury-to-competition standard is employed.
"The fact that there are many firms who could produce and market a product (with-
out significant cost disadvantages) may indicate a significant possibility of potential
competition. . . Potential competition may ... so overhang the market that the
merging companies' power to effect prices or output would be severely restricted." Id.
at 1029.
25 Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Crown Zeller-
bach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
179 F. Supp. 721 (E. D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
26 The best illustration of the lower courts' rejection of production flexibility
is the Bethlehem Steel decision, mtpra note 25. The court held that several iron and
steel products were separate lines of commerce, refusing to accept the defendants'
contentions that the ability of producers to shift from one product to another should
be considered. Judge Weinfeld rejected this concept on the basis that a "definition
... which ignores the buyers and focuses on what the sellers do, or theoretically can
do, is not meaningful." 168 F. Supp. at 592. He went on to find that defendants' con-
tentions were "pure theory" since there was little evidence of any production shifts.
Ibid. Finally, Judge Weinfeld concluded: "It does not follow that the production
flexibility recognized in a vertical integration case under § 1 of the Sherman Act,
like Columbia Steel, is controlling in a horizontal case under § 7 of the Clayton Act."
/d. at 592 n.34.
The Crown Zellerbach decision, supra, followed Bethlehem Steel in rejecting
this test where no actual production shifts are shown. For a detailed discussion of
this case in a production flexibility setting, see Mann & Lewyn, mipra note 23.
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used in conjunction with other market tests. In addition, it should
be noted that at least two Justices of the Supreme Court still regard
the test as being a proper one.2
B. Reasonable interchuangeability and cross-elasticity of demand
A significant majority of the recent Sherman Act cases dis-
cussing the matter have defined the product market in terms of the
consumer-the relevant product market is composed of all products
that are reasonable substitutes for each other and for which there
exists a cross-elasticity of demand on the part of the buying pub-
lic. It was not until the mid-1950's that this concept became preva-
lent in the Sherman Act cases. The earlier decisions, while sometimes
talking about interchangeability of products, usually defined the
market narrowly to consist of only physically indistinguishable
products. 29 The first mention of the interchangeability test ap-
27 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In this important
product market determination case the Court stated the general market test and then
concluded: "The cross-elasticity of production facilities may also be an important
factor in defining a product market within which a vertical merger is to be viewed.'
Id. at 325 n. 42.
28 Justice Harlan, concurring in Brown Shoe, supra at 367, stated that an ac-
curate analysis of the product market would take into account "the interchangeability
of production." He emphasized production flexibility as the primary market test and
felt it to be a more "realistic gauge of the possible anticompetitive effects" than the
district court's test, which placed primary emphasis on the buying public in defining
the market.
Justice Stewart, dissenting in the Alcoa-Rome Cable decision, supra note 15, at
283, concluded that the basic economic concept was to define the market in terms of
the substitutability of either products or production facilities. He justified the com-
bining of insulated aluminum conductor and. insulated copper conductor into one
product market because of the "manufacturing interchangeability between copper and
aluminum." Id. at 285.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 172-73
(1948) (existence of monopoly in motion picture exhibition determined as to first-
run business in individual cities and towns, excluding data on subsequent run substi-
tutes from consideration) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947)
(control of the market for new taxicabs in four large cities held to constitute violation
of Sherman Act, and cab markets in other cities were excluded) ; Indiana Farmer's
Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934) (advertising market
for farm journals limited to certain regions rather than to farm journal advertising
generally); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F2d 416, 422-23 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952) (hydraulic pump held to be in a market distinct
from rod pump and other types); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg.,
Inc., 194 F2d 484, 487 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (particular pro-
duce building held to constitute a monopoly even though alternative selling sites
existed) ; United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F2d 562, 567-68 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951) (purchases by one customer of petroleum products,
buses, and tires held to constitute a separate market from total purchases of such
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pears to have been by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Corn
Prods. Ref. Co.,30 decided in 1916. After formulating the test, Judge
Hand delimited the relevant market narrowly to include starch and
syrup made from corn and exclude the physically distinct products
of starch and syrup made from other raw materials. In 1945, Judge
Hand again had the opportunity to apply the interchangeability
rule to a Sherman Act case and again the market was narrowly
defined to exclude physically distinct products. In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America 3' he intimated that virgin aluminum
ingot constituted a market separate from secondary aluminum in-
got-ingot made from aluminum scrap.
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States32 indicated a willingness to recognize that two
physically distinguishable products which are considered by their
consumers to be substitutes for each other may be included within
the same product market. Two newspapers, Times-Picayune and
the States were owned by the same company, the former being a
morning newspaper and the latter an evening edition. The States
was in competition with the Item for evening newspaper sales,
while the Times-Picayune was the only morning paper in the city.
Defendant publishing company had a policy that any advertisers
desiring space in the morning Times-Picayune also had to advertise
in the evening States. The Government contended this tying ar-
products) ; Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 114 F2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (certain dress designs held to constitute a market distinct from
other dress designs); Cape Cod Food Prods. Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119
F. Supp. 900, 908 (D. Mass. 1954) (processed cranberries found to be separate
market from raw cranberries); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63
F. Supp. 32, 33 (D. Minn. 1945) (linen rugs were held to be a distinct product market
from other floor coverings).
See generally MacDonald, "Product Competition in the Relevant Market Under
the Sherman Act," 53 Mich. L. Rev. 69 (1954).
30 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed on appellant's motion, 249
U.S. 621 (1919). According to Professor Turner, Judge Hand set out two basic
guides for defining the relevant product market in terms of substitutes. "First, sub-
stitutes should be disregarded, even if indistinguishable in character, use, or consumer
preference, whenever their cost of production substantially exceeds that of the product
allegedly monopolized .... Second, whether one should include physically distinguish-
able substitutes depends on comparative consumer preferences and comparative costs
of production." Turner, "Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case," 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 281, 288 (1956). Turner further suggests that the consideration of substitutes here
may have been because this was a "combinationf' case under § 2 of the Sherman Act
rather than an "attempt" or "conspiracy" case. He points out that in the "attempt"
and "conspiracy" cases the courts excluded all "physically distinct substitutes" from
the product market. Id. at 289.
31 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
32 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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rangement violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. An im-
portant issue in the case was a determination of the relevant prod-
uct market. The defendants contended that the relevant market
should include all forms of mass advertising media in competition
with newspapers, such as radio, television, magazines, billboards,
direct mail, etc3 3 The Government contended the relevant market
should include only the morning newspaper 4 The Court,35 through
Mr. Justice Clark, rejected both contentions and held that the
relevant market consisted of advertising readership sold by all
three newspapers.
While the Court refused to include other advertising media in
the product market with newspapers, it did recognize the doctrine
of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand.
The significant market language was contained in a footnote which
stated:
For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market can-
not meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The circle must
be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, with-
in reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers
will turn; in technical terms, products whose "cross-elasticities of
demand" are small. Useful to that determination is, among other
things, the trade's own characterization of the products involved.
The advertising industry and its customers, for example, markedly
differentiate between advertising in newspapers and in other mass
media.36
The Court thus indicated the beginning of a new trend in market
determination.37
33 Brief for Appellant, Times-Picayune Publishing Co., p. 79, Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
34 Brief for Appellant, United States of America, pp. 28-29, Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
35 This was a 5-4 decision. Mr. Justice Burton dissented, joined by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Minton.
36 345 U.S. at 612 n.31.
37 See Maseritz, "The Relevant Market-A Case Study of the Du Pont-General
Motors Decision," 6 Antitrust Bull. 487, 497 (1961). Maseritz suggests three reasons
why the Times-Picayune case marked a turning point in market definition. First, the
concept of cross-elasticity of demand was introduced as a quantitative measure of
substitute products. Second, it was made apparent that the product market was not to
be limited to physically indistinguishable products. Third, the Court relied on actual
market conditions in determining the market and introduced a new factor in the trade's
own characterization of the products.
For a more extensive analysis of the Times-Picayune decision see Note "Defini-
tion of the Market in Tying Arrangements: Another Aspect of Times-Picayune," 63
Yale L. J. 389 (1954).
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In 1956, the Supreme Court fully developed the interchange-
ability test in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.3"
This case established that market definition is not a matter of
conventionally classifying industries or products, but is an eco-
nomic problem to be analyzed by an empirical observation of sub-
stitution. An injunction was sought to restrain du Pont from
monopolizing or attempting to monopolize interstate trade in
cellophane. Du Pont produced almost seventy-five per cent of the
cellophane sold in the United States. The important issue was a
determination of the relevant product market. Du Pont argued
the market should consist of all flexible packaging materials,39 of
which cellophane constituted less than twenty per cent, while the
Government contended that cellophane was the appropriate product
market.40 The Court, through Mr. Justice Reed, considered the
available substitutes for cellophane and the cross-elasticity of
demand between cellophane and other wrappings and found a
broad relevant market including all flexible packaging material,
which resulted in clearing du Pont of any Sherman Act violation.4'
Justice Reed developed the reasonable interchangeability test as
follows:
The "market" which one must study to determine when a pro-
ducer has monopoly power will vary with the part of commerce
under consideration. The tests are constant. The market is com-
posed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the
purposes for which they are produced-price, use and qualities
considered. While the application of the tests remains uncertain,
it seems to us that du Pont should not be found to monopolize
38 351 U.S. 377 (1956) [hereinafter referred to as the Cellophane case].
39 Id. at 394.
40 Id. at 380.
41 The Cellophane case was concerned only with the actual monopolization of
cellophane. The Government on appeal did not raise any issue of an "attempt to
monopolize" or a conspiracy to monopolize under section 2. Id. at 379. The reason-
able interchangeability concept, however, was later extended to attempts and con-
spiracies. In International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), discussed
later in this article, the Court applied the Cellophane test in a case involving conspiracy
as well as monopolization under the Sherman Act. Packard Motor Car Co. v.
Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957),
upheld against alleged Sherman Act violations an exclusive contract for the marketing
of Packard cars in Baltimore. The theory of illegality was that the exclusive contract
constituted both an unreasonable restraint under § 1 and an unlawful attempt or con-
spiracy to monopolize trade in Packard cars under § 2. However, the Court applied the
interchangeability test and held the relevant market to consist of all other cars
that were reasonably interchangeable with Packard cars. See also United States v.
Ohio Crankshaft Co., 19 F.R.D. 368 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
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cellophane when that product has the competition and interchange-
ability with other wrappings that this record shows.42
The Court found reasonable interchangeability between cello-
phane and other wrapping materials even though cellophane was
two or three times as expensive as its chief competitors in the
flexible wrapping market and even though cellophane's prices could
change independently from other materials'. 43 The Court also ad-
mitted that "cellophane combines the desirable elements of trans-
parency, strength and cheapness more definitely than any of the
other wrapping materials. 4 4 The Court emphasized that despite
cellophane's advantages it had to meet competition from other
materials and "except as to permeability to gases, cellophane has
no qualities that are not possessed by a number of other mate-
rials." "; Also emphasized was the fact that there was certain
"responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the
other." 46
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black and Douglas,
dissented on the ground that cellophane was the relevant market
and du Pont had monopoly control in that market. He analyzed
the physical properties of the various wrapping materials and con-
cluded they were not "the self-same products" as cellophane 47 The
dissenters did not feel that "buyers, practical businessmen, would
have bought cellophane in increasing amounts over a quarter of a
42 351 U.S. at 404.
43 Id. at 401. Cellophane's two principal competitors were glassine and grease-
proof papers. The price of moistureproof cellophane per pound was 47.80. The price of
bleached glassine was 17.80 per pound, while the price of bleached greaseproof paper
was 15.80 per pound. Expressed in terms of price per 1,000 square feet (in cents),
moistureproof cellophane was 2.3, bleached glassine 1.0, and bleached greaseproof .9.
See Appendix C, id. at 412. Other flexible packaging materials were much more ex-
pensive than cellophane. Polyethylene for example was 81.00 per pound and Saran
was 99.00 per pound. Ibid.
As to the independence of cellophane's price, Stocking and Mueller conclude,
"Apparently du Pont could ignore the prices of rival papers in setting its own prices."
Stocking & Mueller, "The Cellophane Case and New Competition," 45 Amer. Econ.
Rev. 29, 50 (1955). The authors pointed to large reductions in cellophane prices over
a period of years while the prices of other products remained relatively stable.
44 351 U.S. at 398. According to Appendix B of the Court's opinion, id. at 411,
cellophane is highly transparent and has a high bursting strength. Glassine, one of
cellophane's chief competitors, while cheaper, has a low bursting strength and is
commercially transparent to opaque. The only other product which is highly trans-
parent and has a high bursting point is Saran, but it is twice as expensive as cellophane.
45 Id. at 399. See Appendix B to the opinion of the Court, id. at 411. While
cellophane has excellent resistance to grease and oils, so does aluminum foil, cellulose
acetate, Pliofilm, Saran, and Cry-O-Rap. Similarly, while cellophane is highly trans-
parent, so is cellulose acetate, Pliofilm, and Saran.
46 Id. at 400.
47 Id. at 414 (dissenting opinion).
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century if close substitutes were available at from one-seventh to
one-half cellophane's price." 48
The Cellophane decision caused alarm among advocates of a
strong antitrust policy and is still often considered today as a
questionable decision.4 9 In 1964, Emanuel Celler stated, "I do not
believe that the cellophane case, in which it was held that a
$100,000,000 industry could not be monopolized, was good law
either in an economic or anti-trust sense." 10 The major criticism
levied on the Cellophane decision is that the Court considered only
the technical possibilities of substitution and ignored the significant
price differences and the independent price behavior of cellophane.51
This objection to the broad market as developed in Cellophane
seems justified and, as indicated below, although subsequent cases
have used the interchangeability test they have emphasized its
limitation of "price, use and qualities considered" to delineate a
narrower relevant market.
Before leaving Cellophane, it is interesting to note that the
Court reaffirmed the statements in earlier cases that under the
present test the product market could not be stretched to include
"the interindustry competition emphasized by some economists." 52
This concept appeared in the cases before and after Cellophane,
but is now dead under the Continental Can 53 doctrine discussed
below.
48 Id. at 417 (dissenting opinion).
49 See, e.g., Barnes, "The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe De-
cision," 51 Geo. L. J. 706, 731 (1963); Celler, "The Celler-Kefauver Act and the
Quest for Market Certainty," 50 A.B.AJ. 559 (1964) ; Stocking, "Economic Change
and the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on 'Workable Competition,"' 44 Va. L.
Rev. 537, 567-72 (1958) ; Comment, 3 Wayne L. Rev. 43 (1956).
5O Celler, supra note 49, at 559.
51 See Hall, "Market Definition and Antitrust Policy," 20 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
47 (1963); Stocking & Mueller, supra note 43. Citing Cellophane as an example,
Hall states, "Those decisions in which judicial attention focused primarily on tech-
nical substitution have been the ones most criticized by economists." Hall, supra at
63. Price relationships as well as technical possibilities of substitution must be con-
sidered. Ibid. There is also some authority questioning the Court's failure to analyze
the differences in production costs among the various wrapping materials. Turner,
"Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1956). Turner
concludes that the product market test must involve a determination of costs so that
substitutes "will be excluded where the Government shows that at prices producing
a high cross-elasticity the alleged monopolist has a substantial cost advantage." Id.
at 309. He continues, "the alleged monopolist [should] carry the burden of proving
that the competition of substitutes is on a par in terms of cost as well as price, use,
and qualities." Id. at 318.
52 351 U.S. at 393.
53 Supra note 16. The Court actually only paid lip service to this concept in
Cellophane. Justice Reed stated that brick would not be placed in the same market
with steel or wood or cement or stone, but in almost the same breath put plain grease-
proof paper and aluminum foil in a common product market. 351 U.S. at 393.
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In 1959, the Supreme Court went a long way toward dispelling
the fears of those who felt that the Cellophane case had precluded
effective administration of the antitrust laws under section 2 of
the Sherman Act by its broad definition of the product market. In
International Boxing Club v. United States,"4 the Court applied
the Cellophane test and came up with a narrow market definition
which resulted in a Sherman Act violation. Defendants were charged
with a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade in the
promotion of professional boxing matches and with a conspiracy
to monopolize and a monopolization of the same in violation of
both sections 1 and 2 of the Act. The product market issue was
whether the market should include all professional boxing contests
or only championship contests. As in Cellophane, defendants were
arguing for a broad market definition which would include all pro-
fessional bouts and the Government was again contending for a
narrow definition. Mr. Justice Clark," for the Court, upheld the
Government's contention and, after stating the Cellophane test,
concluded that nonchampionship and championship fights were not
interchangeable.
Although applying the Cellophane test, the Court emphasized
the limitation in that test, i.e., "price, use and qualities consid-
ered." '6 The Court recognized there were significant price differ-
entials and a significant difference in consumer preference between
championship and nonchampionship fights. The Court also recog-
nized a "particular and special demand" r7 for championship con-
tests among radio broadcasting and telecasting companies. Both
Cellophane and the present case emphasized a consumer-based
definition of the market, but in Cellophane the Court emphasized
technical possibilities of substitution despite the fact that signifi-
cant price differentials existed, while the Court in International
Boxing Club did recognize the actualities of cost or price.
r8
54 358 U.S. 242 (1959). For a more detailed analysis of International Boxing
Club, see 33 St. John's L. Rev. 374 (1959) ; 33 Tul. L. Rev. 710 (1959).
55 Justice Clark took no part in the consideration of the Cellophane case. United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 38, at 404.
56 Ibid.
57 358 U.S. at 251.
58 The price differentials existing between championship and nonchampionship
fights were illustrated in terms of defendants' revenue. For example, television rights
to one championship fight brought in $100,000 in contrast to $45,000 in revenue from
such rights to a nontitle fight seven months later between the same two boxers. Id.
at 250. It was also noted that spectators pay "substantially more' for tickets to cham-
pionship fights than for nonchampionship contests. Ibid. Thus both television net-
works and spectators had to pay a significantly higher price if they desired to sub-
stitute a championship fight for a nontitle bout.
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It is also interesting to note that although the Court in Inter-
national Boxing Club applied the Cellophane test of the relevant
market, it stated that "the case which most squarely governs this
case is United States v. Paramount Pictures, (1948) 334 U.S. 495. " r0
In that case the district court had confined the relevant market
to that for nationwide movie distribution and the Supreme Court
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the charges
after holding that the relevant market was first-run movies in
certain designated geographical areas. Paramount Pictures was the
same case which the dissenters in Cellophane felt had been dis-
regarded by the majority."o
The Court also noted in International Boxing Club that the
relevant market met the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test
as developed by cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act and dis-
cussed later in this article.61
Although other tests have sometimes been suggested under the
Sherman Act cases, it appears from the above discussion that the
two most important are production flexibility, a test defined in
terms of producers and today somewhat disregarded,6 2 and reason-
able interchangeability, a test defined in terms of consumers, which
could be further divided into potential or technical interchange-
ability and actual interchangeability. These tests should be kept
in mind for a comparison with the Clayton Act cases discussed
below.
III. THE CLAYTON ACT
It is under section 7, the anti-merger provision of the Clayton
Act as amended in 1950, that most of the important relevant market
cases are decided today. As stated above, section 7 prohibits stock
or asset acquisitions where the effect of such acquisition is sub-
stantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly "in
59 Id. at 251.
60 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 38, at 423. This
reliance upon Paramount Pictures by the majority in International Boxing Chlb and
the dissenters in Cellophane emphasizes the Court's change of position in the applica-
tion of the reasonable interchangeability test. In this connection it is also important
to recognize the significant change in the Court's membership between 1956 and
1959. Of the four Justices who comprised the majority in Cellophane, only Mr.
Justice Frankfurter remained when the International Boxing Club decision was ren-
dered. On the other hand, all three of the Cellophane dissenters (Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas) remained in 1959 and still remain today. This may
have been a strong factor in the change from a broad product market in Cellophane
to the narrower market of International Boxing Club.
61 358 U.S. at 252 rL8.
62 But see notes 27 & 28 supra.
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any line of commerce in any section of the country." 63 The phrase
"in any line of commerce" refers to the product market and it has
received substantial analysis by the courts in recent years.
For clarity of discussion, the development of section 7 tests
can be divided into four distinct periods: (1) the period before
the landmark case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States; 64 (2) the
Brown Shoe decision itself; (3) the application of Brown Shoe be-
fore Continental Can and Alcoa-Rome Cable; (4) the Continental
Can and Alcoa-Rome Cable decisions of 1964.
A. Pre-Brown Shoe
Before 1950 and the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section
7, product market definition was important in two old section 7
cases, in both of which the market was narrowly defined. In FTC
v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.,65 defendant Thatcher, a manufacturer of milk
bottles, was accused of violating section 7 by the acquisition of
Woodbury Glass Company, primarily a manufacturer of condiment
and whiskey bottles. Woodbury also manufactured a very small
amount of milk bottles-less than one percent of its total produc-
tion.6 Thatcher did not compete with Woodbury in any line except
milk bottles. Woodbury was considering abandonment of milk
bottle production and the acquisition by Thatcher resulted in such
abandonment. In determining whether this merger substantially
lessened competition, Judge Wooley looked only to a product
market consisting of milk bottles and held that since Woodbury
produced such an insignificant amount there would be no violation
of section 7.67
In International Shoe Co. v. FTC,68 the Supreme Court in de-
fining the product market separated the shoes manufactured by
the acquired company from those manufactured by the acquiring
company. The shoes of one company "were better finished, more
attractive and modem in appearance, and appealed especially to
city trade." 69 The shoes of the other company were of a "better
wearing quality" 70 but were not of the dress type. The narrow
market construction in this case, as in Thatcher, resulted in validat-
63 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
64 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
65 5 F2d 615 (3d Cir. 1925), inodified sub nom. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272
U.S. 554 (1926).
66 Its annual production of milk bottles was only about 8,000 gross out of a
total production of over 1,000,000 gross. 5 F.2d at 622.
67 Ibid.
68 280 U.S. 291 (1930).




ing the merger. The markets in both of these cases were as narrow
or narrower than the markets of Sherman Act cases of a similar
period. 71
The legislative history of the 1950 amendment is not indicative
of whether the market under new section 7 (or the similarly de-
fined section 3 market) was intended to differ from the market
definition under the Sherman Act cases or under the 1914 version of
the Clayton Act. Several commentators have stated that Congress
did not intend a new definition of the product market under the
1950 amendments.
72
The most significant case of this period is United States v. E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.73 Although interpreting "old" section
7 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court provided a useful guide-
line for determining the relevant product market and this guide-
line was followed in subsequent "new" section 7 cases. The Govern-
ment filed its complaint in June 1949, alleging that du Pont had
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the
Clayton Act as the result of the purchase of a twenty-three per cent
stock interest in General Motors during the years 1917-1919.7' Du
Pont was supplying General Motors with substantial amounts of
finishes and fabrics and the issue was whether this was the result
of du Pont's control over General Motors and if so whether there
was a substantial lessening of competition.75 The determination of
the relevant product market was a crucial issue. There were three
71 See Comment, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 865 (1962). See also supra note 29.
72 See Martin, Mergers and the Clayton Act 20-56 (1959); Mann & Lewyn,
"Relevant Market under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Dif-
ferent Views" 47 Va. L. Rev. 1014 (1961); Comment, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861
(1962).
73 353 U.S. 586 (1957) [hereinafter referred to as die Pont-General Motors].
74 Id. at 588.
75 The Court held that du Pont's position was obtained by its control over
General Motors rather than by competitive merit. Id. at 605. There were also two
other significant holdings in this case which are not relevant for the purposes of this
paper. First, the Court made it clear that section 7 applied to vertical as well as
horizontal mergers. Secondly, the Court held that the relevant date for examining
the acquisition was at the time of the suit, rather than at the date of the acquisi-
tion. Even though there was no violation at the time of acquisition in 1919, if there
was one at the time of suit in 1949, appropriate action could be maintained. Even
when the purchase of stock is "solely for investment, the plain language of § 7 con-
templates an action at any time the stock is used to bring about or in attempting
to bring about the substantial lessening of competition." Id. at 597-98. For a more
detailed discussion of these issues see Barnes, "Competitive Mores and Legal Tests
in Merger Cases: The Du Pont-General Motors Decision," 46 Geo. L.J. 564, 602
(1958); Dirlam & Stelzer, "The Du Pont-General Motors Decision: In the Anti-
trust Grain," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 24 (1958); Rogers, "United States v. du Pont-
General Motors-A Judicial Revision of Section 7," 2 Antitrust Bull. 577 (1957).
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possible market alternatives-a conglomerate market consisting of
all products purchased by du Pont from General Motors, a broad
all-industry market consisting of finishes and fabrics, or a narrow
market consisting of automobile finishes and products.76 Du Pont
argued that the relevant market should consist of all finishes and
fabrics since judged in this light du Pont's sales to General Motors
would be an insubstantial share of the market. In 1947 du Pont's
sales of finishes to General Motors comprised 3.5 per cent of all
sales of finishes to industrial users while its fabric sales to General
Motors constituted only 1.6 per cent of the total market.77 If, on
the other hand, the relevant product market were considered to
be limited to automotive finishes and fabrics, a different picture
would develop. General Motors' requirements for automotive
finishes and fabrics represented approximately 50 per cent of the
total market for such fabrics. 8 Du Pont supplied 67 per cent of
General Motors' requirements for finishes in 1946 and 68 per cent
in 1947, and it supplied 52.3 per cent of General Motors' fabric
requirements in 1946 and 38.5 per cent in 1947.79 Thus du Pont
controlled approximately 34 per cent of the automotive finishes
market and approximately 19 per cent of the automotive fabric
market in those years.
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority in a 4-2 deci-
sion, rejected du Pont's bid for a broad product market, held the
relevant market to be automotive finishes and fabrics and went on
to find a violation of section 7. In defining the product market
Justice Brennan developed what has come to be known as the
"peculiar characteristics and uses" test. He concluded:
The record shows that automobile finishes and fabrics have suffi-
cient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them products
sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to make
them a "line of commerce" within the meaning of the Clayton
Act.... Thus, the bounds of the relevant market for the purposes
of this case are not coextensive with the total market for finishes
and fabrics, but are coextensive with the automobile industry,
the relevant market for automotive finishes and fabrics.80
Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissented
and one of his grounds was that the record did not show that
automotive finishes and fabrics possessed sufficient peculiar charac-
teristics and uses to distinguish them from other finishes and
76 See Barnes, supra note 75, at 608.
77 353 U.S. at 593.
78 Id. at 596.
79 Ibid.
80 Id. at 593.
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fabrics.8 ' He pointed out that the district court did not reach the
question of the relevant market and the record did not contain
any findings of fact dealing with this issue."
As the dissenters pointed out,8 3 Justice Brennan in adopting
the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test did not go into an ex-
tensive analysis of what these distinguishing characteristics and uses
were. His discussion of that matter is relegated to a footnote wherein
he mentions that one type of finish supplied to General Motors
by du Pont was a significant advance in automobile finishing and
that, since there are no standard prices for automobile fabrics as
there are in other industries, bids are submitted on them. 4 Need-
less to say, such observations do little for justifying a separation of
automotive finishes and fabrics into a distinct market. 5 It has been
81 Id. at 650 (dissenting opinion).
82 Id. at 649 n.30 (dissenting opinion). Because of this, Justice Burton believed
that the Court should remand the case to the district court so that the district judge,
who had a greater degree of familiarity with the case, could review the record, and
"entertain argument with respect to the substantiality of the share of the relevant
market affected by the foreclosure which the Court finds to exist. By declining to
remand, the Court necessitates a scrutining here of this huge record for a determina-
tion of an essentially factual question not passed on by the District Court, and not
thoroughly briefed or argued by the parties." Ibid.
83 Id. at 650 (dissenting opinion).
84 Id. at 594 n.12.
85 Although Justice Brennan excluded an analytical examination of finishes and
fabrics to support his conclusion that automotive finishes and fabrics possessed suf-
ficient peculiar characteristics and uses, an excellent analysis of the finishes market
appears in Maseritz, "The Relevant Market-A Case Study of the Du Pont-General
Motors Decision," 6 Antitrust Bull. 487, 508 (1961). Maseritz analyses the finishes
market in terms of classification, end-uses (including an analysis of technical and
chemical properties), and expert evaluation of the market. He concludes that there
are three distinguishing characteristics of automotive finishes: "(1) a finish with
excellent color, gloss, and durability; (2) rapid application and drying of the finish;
and (3) a finish capable of achieving certain chemical and physical properties at the
lowest cost possible." Id. at 527-28.
Maseritz believes the main justification for giving automotive finishes a sepa-
rate market category is "because of the concentration of its users and the resulting
economics of large scale production." Id. at 528. The buyer side of the market is
composed solely of three or four large companies. In order for a firm producing
automotive finishes to survive, it must "gain a foothold in the sales to one of the
major firms." Id. at 529. Hence, there are a small number of sellers. In addition,
large-scale, speedy production necessitates the production of a finish with special
characteristics, such as rapid application and drying.
Maseritz also makes an interesting distinction between the relationship of cello-
phane to the flexible wrappings market (Cellophane case) and of automotive finishes
to the total finishes market. Here again, it is the structure of the automobile industry
that provides the distinction. "Qualitatively, automotive finishes are as much a part
of the finishes market as cellophane is of the wrappings market. Similarly, the func-
tional distinction between appliance and automotive finishes is no greater than the
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suggested that the evidence supporting the distinctive characteris-
tics was supplied by the defense in attempting to justify the course
of trade between du Pont and General Motors as being based on
competitive merit.8 6 The defense contended that the justification
for this course of trade was because the du Pont products were
especially suited to the General Motors requirementsIT The lack
of factual analysis of the products in issue has drawn criticism
from several commentators.88
It should be noted that the du Pont-General Motors case came
only one year after the Cellophane case in which the Supreme Court
found a broad relevant product market by use of the reasonable
interchangeability test. What accounted for the different tests in
these two cases? Some authors feel the difference is the result of one
case's being a Sherman Act case and the other a Clayton Act sec-
tion 7 case,"9 while others believe there is no difference in the two
tests." Further discussion of this matter is left until later in this
article when the Sherman and Clayton tests are compared. How-
ever, it is interesting to note here a change in the personnel of the
Supreme Court between the two cases, which may be one plausible
reason for the different approaches.9 In the Cellophane case, Justice
difference between cellophane and aluminum foil." Id. at 530. However, the users
of cellophane are "multifarious, ranging from candy to cigar manufacturers," while
the use of automotive finishes "is restricted to a handful of manufacturers." Id. at
524.
86 See Barnes, supra note 75, at 611.
87 Brief for Appellee, p. 23, United States v. E. I. du Pont & de Nemours, 353
U.S. 586 (1957).
88 See, e.g., Adelman, "The Du Pont-General Motors Decision," 43 Va. L. Rev.
873, 877 (1957); Handler, "Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments," 12
The Record 411, 417 (1957) ; Markham, "The Du Pont-General Motors Decision,"
43 Va. L. Rev. 881, 887 (1957). Markham concludes that the four major products
which the Court included in the automotive finishes and fabrics market were Duco,
Dulux, imitation leather, and coated fabrics. He points out that a more extensive
factual analysis would have considered the following facts: that Dulux, which the
Court included in the automotive market, was used on refrigerators and other appli-
ances but not on cars; that 51.5% of all Duco sales were made outside the auto-
motive industry in 1947; and that 80% of du Pont's output of imitation leather and
coated fabrics of the type used in the automobile industry was sold to manufacturers
of other products such as luggage, brief cases, etc. Markham therefore concludes
that the market of automotive finishes and fabrics was drawn too narrowly.
89 See, e.g., Bock, Mergers and Markets 87, 102-03 (1964) ; Dirlam & Stelzer,
"The Du Pont-General Motors Decision: In the Antitrust Grain," supra note 75,
at 40; Comment, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 875 (1962).
90 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 51; Hander & Robinson, "A Decade of Adminis-
tration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1961).
91 The difference between the two cases is explained upon this ground in Steele,
"Decade of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1049, 1058
(1961) ; See also Markham, supra note 88, at 885.
Reed wrote the opinion for the majority, composed of Justices
Burton, Minton, Frankfurter, and himself. Justice Warren, Black,
and Douglas dissented, while Justices Harlan and Clark took no
part in the decision. The following year in the du Pont-General
Motors decision, Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the majority
and was joined by the dissenters in the Cellophane case-Warren,
Black, and Douglas. Justices Burton and Frankfurter, majority
justices in Cellophane, dissented. Justices Clark, Harlan, and Whit-
taker abstained. The liberal coalition on the Court was thrown
into the position of a majority. 2
Subsequent to du Pont-General Motors and prior to the Brown
Shoe decision, the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test was in-
volved by the lower courts in three section 7 cases: United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,"3 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC,"' and
A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC."
In the Bethlehem Steel decision Judge Weinfeld gave added
weight to the restrictive approach taken by the Court in du Pont-
General Motors. This was a proceeding by the Government to en-
join a proposed merger between the second and sixth largest steel
corporations on the grounds that it would substantially lessen
competition within the meaning of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The defendants defended this charge on the ground that the com-
petition between them was de minimis.98 The parties were in sig-
nificant conflict over what the relevant product market should be
and over what tests should be invoked. The Government urged a
broad line of commerce consisting of the entire iron and steel in-
dustry and several narrow lines of commerce consisting of various
steel products-hot rolled sheets, cold rolled sheets, hot rolled bars,
etc. It contended these products all had sufficient peculiar char-
acteristics and uses to constitute them separate lines of commerce
within the du Pont-General Motors testy7 The defendants rejected
all of the Government's lines of commerce and also challenged the
validity of the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test." Instead,
92 See Time, July 1, 1957, pp. 12-13. It has been suggested that if Justices Clark,
Harlan, and Whittaker had taken part in the decision, the result would have been
5-4 in favor of defendants. See Rogers, supra note 75, at 581.
93 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
94 296 F2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
95 301 F2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
98 Supra note 93, at 581. For a more detailed discussion of the Bethlehem Steel
decision see Notes, 45 Cornell L.Q. 96 (1959); 28 Fordham L. Rev. 147 (1959);
.37 Texas L. Rev. 766 (1959); 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 686.
97 168 F. Supp. at 589.
08 The defendants sought to distinguish the "peculiar characteristics and uses"
of the du Pont-General Motors case on the basis that there was no evidence of
production flexibility in that case. Id. at 592 n.34.
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they invoked the Sherman Act tests of production flexibility and
reasonable interchangeability as appropriate for determining the
relevant lines of commerce. 9 The defendants urged a broad line of
commerce consisting of "common finished steel products" and
several narrow lines of commerce based on mill product lines. Thus
the parties had urged upon the court all three of the prior judi-
cially developed tests. Judge Weinfeld rejected the defendants'
contentions and upheld the Government's, stating that the lines of
commerce it urged possessed sufficient peculiar characteristics and
uses to constitute separate product markets.100 In rejecting the
reasonable interchangeability test Judge Weinfeld indicated it
was not an appropriate test for a section 7 case when he con-
cluded, "There can be a substantial lessening of competition with
respect to a product whether or not there are reasonably inter-
changeable substitutes." ' 101 The production flexibility concept
was rejected on two grounds: because it was a test which focused
on producers and ignored consumers,0 2 and because it was pure
theory where no actual shifts in production were shown. 03 After
defining the relevant product market, Judge Weinfeld went on to
find a substantial lessening of competition and a violation of
section 7.
In the Crown, Zellerbach 104 decision the court of appeals for
the Ninth Circuit also had the opportunity to apply the "peculiar
characteristics and uses" test. This case involved the merger of
two paper companies. The acquired company, St. Helens Pulp and
99 Id. at 589.
100 Id. at 592-94. One writer criticizes Judge Weinfeld for applying the "peculiar
characteristics and uses" test to determine the broad product market of iron and
steel in general. Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1269, 1275-76 (1958). The argument
is that this test should be used only in determining narrow lines of commerce as was
the case in du Pont-General Motors and as was true of the narrow product markets
in the instant case.
101 Id. at 593-94 n.36. For a strong criticism of the court's rejection of reason-
able interchangeability and acceptance of "peculiar characteristics and uses" see
Adelman, "Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion," 45 Va. L. Rev. 684 (1959).
In speaking of the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test Adelman concludes, "As
a general conclusory remark in the court of last resort it may be suitable, but as
grounds for defining a line of commerce or market, it has little or no meaning except
as a battle-cry or slogan for those who wish to see profound and exciting contradic-
tions between du Pont-Cellophane and du Pont-General Motors." Id. at 689.
102 "Production flexibility did not imply buyer flexibility." Maseritz, .supra note
85, at 533.
103 168 F. Supp. at 592. See note 26 supra. Judge Weinfeld in a footnote further
indicated that "it does not follow that the production flexibility recognized in a
vertical integration case under § 1 of the Sherman Act, like Columbia Steel, is con-
trolling in a horizontal case under § 7 of the Clayton Act." 168 F. Supp. at 592 n.34.
104 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
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Paper, was a producer of coarse papers, while the acquiring com-
pany, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, produced and sold a complete
line of paper products. The relevant product market issue revolved
around what type of papers should be included. The Bureau of
Census listed various types of coarse paper categories, one of which
was Census coarse paper.' °0  Eighty-four per cent of St. Helens'
production was of coarse paper in that category and the Federal
Trade Commission determined that this category was the relevant
product market. The defendants challenged this finding on the
ground that there was a great degree of interchangeability between
Census coarse papers and other trade coarse papers and hence the
market should be all trade coarse papers.10 6 They also invoked the
production flexibility concept in support of this market since
one machine by simple adjustment could produce any type of coarse
paper.10 7 Judge Pope, speaking for the court, followed the approach
of the Bethlehem Steel decision and rejected defendants' conten-
tions on the basis that the proper test was the "peculiar character-
istics and uses" test. Judge Pope justified defining the product
market in terms of Census coarse paper on the ground that such
paper served different purposes, had different physical character-
istics, was composed of different quality paper, and had different
end uses than other trade coarse papers.10 Defendants' production
flexibility argument was rejected as being pure theory since no
actual production shifts were shown. 0 9 Judge Pope also rejected
105 This category constituted less than 20% of all coarse papers. Id. at 805.
106 Id. at 807.
107 Id. at 812.
108 Id. at 813. In the instant case, as in the du Pont-General Motors case, there
is no appreciable discussion of what the peculiar characteristics and uses that dis-
tinguished Census coarse papers from other trade coarse paper were. One distinguish-
ing characteristic was the fact that the papers were composed of different quality
paper. As to peculiar uses, the court points out that flexible wrapping paper, a type
of Census coarse paper, is used for wrapping merchandise for delivery to customers,
while paperboard, a non-Census coarse paper, was used for boxes and cartons in
the crate type container market. However, looking at the various types of papers
included in Census coarse papers and comparing them with other trade papers, it
appears that there were substantial peculiar characteristics and uses possessed by
Census coarse papers. For example, Census coarse paper includes wrapping paper,
bag paper, envelope paper, gumming paper, etc., and these papers certainly have
peculiar characteristics and uses when compared to other trade coarse papers such
as toilet tissue stock, corrugating material, cardboard, facial tissue stock, etc.
109 Id. at 812-13. As pointed out earlier in this article, "production flexibility"
was originally developed in a vertical merger case, the Columbia Steel decision.
When analyzing the competitive effects of a vertical merger the courts have looked
at the market foreclosed to competitors of the acquiring company. Hence, if pro-
tection of competitors is the aim then their ability to switch from one product to
another will be relevant. However, in considering a horizontal merger, as was the
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the reasonable interchangeability test, citing Bethlehem Steel for
the proposition that such a test is not applicable in a section 7
proceeding."" In the relevant market defined by the court, the
merging companies produced seventy-six per cent of the total
production and hence a violation of section 7 was found.
The court made two other significant pronouncements con-
cerning the product market in Crown Zellerbach. First, the court
made the rather novel conclusion that when considering the relevant
product market it is permissible to confine such consideration "to
those products which were mainly and principally the products sold
by the absorbed company." "'1 While this may have some relevance
in a vertical merger where the competitive effects are considered in
light of what market is foreclosed to the competitors of the ac-
quiring company, i.e., the product market of the acquired company,
it seems to have no place in an analysis of the market in a horizontal
merger. Secondly, the court emphasized as a primary consideration
in distinguishing the two types of coarse papers the fact of industry
recognition of Census coarse papers as a separate product line."'
This concept was to reappear later in the Brown Shoe case.
In Spalding,"3 the court was faced with the acquisition of
Rawlings Mfg. Co. by Spalding & Bros., both manufacturers of
athletic goods. The court of appeals found that the relevant market
consisted of athletic goods as a whole, and within that market, of
higher and lower price categories of individual athletic goods, such
as footballs and baseballs. The court used both the "peculiar char-
acteristics and uses" and interchangeability tests in distinguishing
higher priced from lower priced athletic goods. The court stated:
Those peculiar characteristics and uses were found to be in the
superior raw materials and labor with which those products were
constructed as distinguished from the low priced ones; in their
particular suitability for use in organized competitive games and
in that they were not interchangeable with low priced items for the
purposes of their purchasers in the market. The Commission
case in Bethelehen Steel and the instant case, the emphasis is ordinarily placed on
the consumers and the production flexibility concept has little usefulness. Hence
the court in the instant case may have been justified in not relying on production
flexibility.
110 Id. at 814. As noted above the emphasis in horizontal mergers is usually
placed on consumers. Why then reject the consumer-based reasonable interchange-
ability test? One suggestion has been that the court failed to distinguish between
concepts used in vertical and horizontal mergers. See Mann & Lewyn, supra note
72, at 1026. This article contains an extensive examination of the Crown Zellerbach
case and a well developed criticism of the court's market determination.
111 296 F.2d at 811.
112 Id. at 813.
113 Supra note 95.
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found that these higher priced products constituted a distinct area
of effective competition."14
As the Spalding case suggests there have been section 7 cases
which have followed the reasonable interchangeability test of Cello-
phane rather than the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test
of du Pont-General Motors, even though the former test was de-
veloped in a section 2 Sherman Act case while the latter was
adopted in a section 7 case. One such case was American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.""5 Cuban-American owned
twenty-one per cent of the stock of American Crystal and an
injunction was sought to keep Cuban-American from gaining con-
trol. Crystal manufacturered beet sugar and Cuban-American manu-
factured cane sugar. Cane sugar is more expensive than beet sugar
and is used primarily by households, while beet sugar is used by
industrial customers. The defendants sought to place the companies
in different markets by having beet and cane sugar separated into
different product markets. Under the du Pont-General Motors test
it would seem that the two products would be placed in different
markets since each had its own characteristics, prices, and buyer
demands. However, the court considered the fact that the products
had substantially the same end uses and were sensitive to each
other's price changes and held that the product market should
include both beet and cane sugar because there was a "high degree
of interchangeability." 116
In 1960, the same district court that decided the Bethlehem
Steel decision one year earlier had another chance to consider the
relevant product market in United States v. Columbia Pictures
Corp.1"7 The Government contended that an agreement between
Universal Pictures and Screen Gems, a subsidiary of Columbia,
whereby Screen Gems obtained for a fourteen-year period control
over the distribution of six hundred feature films for television
substantially lessened competition under section 7.11s The Govern-
ment contended that the relevant product market should be limited
114 301 F.2d at 602.
115 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
116 Id. at 398. It should be noted here that the district court probably did not
have access to the du Pont-General Motors decision since it was decided on June 6,
1957. For a more detailed discussion of the instant case see Comment, 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 1269, 1271-80 (1958).
117 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
118 There was also a § 1 Sherman Act charge which was dismissed. This agree-
ment was brought under § 7 by a holding that the exclusive distribution rights
received by Screen Gems constituted the acquisition of an asset within § 7. Id. at
181-83.
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to feature films for television. It also contended that the "peculiar
characteristics and uses" test was the only proper one in a section 7
case." 9 However, the court held that the product market should
consist of all television programming material and, viewed within
that market, there was no substantial lessening of competition. In
reaching the market determination, Judge Herlands recognized both
the Cellophane test of reasonable interchangeability and the du
Pont-General Motors test of "peculiar characteristics and uses" and
concluded that they were "but different verbalizations of the same
criterion." 120 In determining the relevant product market the court
considered a number of factors, such as means by which the prod-
ucts were sold, characteristics and uses of the products, prices, and
the degree of interchangeability. Thus, the same court that rejected
the reasonable interchangeability test in Bethlehem Steel was
readopting it in Columbia Pictures and holding that there was no
inconsistency between the two major tests. 2'
A third section 7 case which accepted the reasonable inter-
changeability concept of Cellophane was Erie Sand & Gravel Co.
v. FTC.1 22 A sand dredging company had merged with its principal
competitor and the Commission found that this substantially les-
sened competition in the lake sand business in an area consisting
of a twelve-mile strip of land bordering on Lake Erie. On appeal,
Judge Hastie held that the Commission had erred in determining
the relevant product market. The merging firms were in competition
in supplying concrete sand, of which there were two principal
types in the Lake Erie area: bank sand and lake sand. The Com-
mission restricted the product market to lake sand. Judge Hastie
concluded that the two types of sand should be in the same market
since bank sand "has proved interchangeable with lake sand." 13
The Cellophane case was cited with approval. 24
119 Id. at 185.
120 Id. at 184.
121 It is interesting to note the development of the product market test in the
district court for the southern district of New York. In 1957, Judge Dawson held in
the American Crystal Sugar case that the reasonable interchangeability test was
proper in a § 7 case. In 1959, Judge Weinfeld rejected reasonable interchangeability
as a § 7 test in Bethlehem Steel and held that "peculiar characteristics and uses"
was the true test. In 1960, Judge Herlands held the two tests were actually "dif-
ferent verbalizations of the same criterion" and a proper market determination in-
volved consideration of both interchangeability and characteristics and uses. These
three cases represent the struggle of the lower courts to apply the proper market
test before Browu Shoe.
122 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
123 Id. at 281.
124 Ibid. For a more detailed discussion of the instant case, including discussion
of the significant geographical market concept involved, see Mann & Lewyn, "The
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The above cases indicate that between 1957 and 1962 the lower
courts were struggling to apply the proper tests as handed down
by the Supreme Court in its three major cases-Columbia Steel,
Cellophane, and du Pont-General Motors. 12  However, about the
only consistent pattern to emerge from these cases was a pattern of
inconsistency. Of the six cases discussed, two rejected interchange-
ability and relied on "peculiar characteristics and uses, ' '12 6 two
relied solely on interchangeability, 127 while the remaining two
recognized both tests and applied them as consistent with each
other.'28 One consistent note was the rejection of production flexi-
bility by the two courts that considered that test.129
B. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
In 1962, the relevant market concept underwent its most sig-
nificant refinement to date in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.3 0
For the first time the Supreme Court passed on the scope of
amended section 7. The Government sought to enjoin a proposed
merger between the defendants Brown Shoe Co. and G. R. Kinney
Co. on the ground that the merger would violate section 7. Brown
was the third largest seller of shoes by dollar volume in the United
Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Dif-
ferent Views," 47 Va. L. Rev. 1014 (1961).
125 For a significant lower court opinion considering the product market under
the Sherman Act during this period see United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F.
Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In that case defendants were charged with the monopoliza-
tion of the importation and sale of certain trademarked perfumes under § 2 of the
act. The defendants argued that under the Cellophane test the product market would
consist of all perfumes since they were reasonably interchangeable with each other.
The court stated the Cellophane test but came up with narrow product markets con-
sisting of single brands of perfumes. The perfume market was held to be not char-
acterized by cross-elasticity of demand or consumer sensitivity to price changes. This
case might be considered a forerunner to the International Boxing Club case where
the Supreme Court applied the Cellophane test to define the market narrowly. See
notes 54-60 supra, and accompanying text. For a more detailed analysis of the
Guerlain case see Note, 43 Va. L. Rev. 1123 (1957).
For two other lower court Sherman Act cases concerning the relevant product
market in this period see Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), and Schwing Motor
Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D.Md. 1956), aff'd per curiam 239
F2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
120 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 94; United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., supra note 93.
127 A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, supra note 95; United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., supra note 117.
128 Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, supra note 122; American Crystal Sugar
Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., supra note 115.
129 Supra note 125.
130 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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States and Kinney was the eighth largest. Kinney had an extensive
chain of retail outlets throughout the country. The Government
contended that the effect of the merger "may be substantially to
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly" by eliminating
competition in the distributions of shoes and in the retail sales of
shoes.'-" The Government's motion for a preliminary injunction was
denied and the companies were permitted to merge on the stipula-
tion that their assets be kept separately identifiable. After trial,
the district court found that the merger might substantially lessen
competition and ordered Brown to dispose of its presently owned
Kinney stock. 3 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Government contended that the relevant product market
consisted of shoes generally, or alternatively, men's, women's,
and children's shoes considered separately.13 The defendants con-
tended that in determining the relevant product market one must
consider not only age and sex differences, but also grades, qualities,
prices, and uses of shoes.3  Defendants were contending that the
medium-priced shoes of Brown were in a product market different
from the low-priced shoes of Kinney. The district court found that
the relevant lines of commerce were men's, women's, and children's
shoes, and the Supreme Court agreed.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, adopted a
new definition of the product market which seems to combine the
interchangeability test, the "peculiar characteristics and uses"
test, and possibly even the production flexibility test. Chief Jus-
tice Warren used the interchangeability test to determine the
outer boundaries of the product market, but went on to hold
that within this broad product market several submarkets may
exist and their boundaries are to be determined by certain prac-
tical indicia including the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses.
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by
the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of
demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. However,
131 There were both vertical and horizontal aspects to the merger here. The
vertical aspect was that Brown was a major manufacturer of shoes and Kinney a
major retailer and that the merger would give Brown another retail outlet for its
shoes through the Kinney retail stores. The Government contended this vertical aspect
foreclosed other manufacturers from the market represented by Kinney's retail out-
lets, thus substantially lessening competition in manufacturers' distribution of shoes.
The horizontal aspects of the merger related to the fact that in many areas both
Brown and Kinney were retailing shoes and were in direct competition with each
other.
132 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
133 370 U.S. at 297.
134 Id. at 298.
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within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes. [Citing the du Pont-General Motors case]. The bound-
aries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar char-
acteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct custom-
ers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
vendors. Because § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger
which may substantially lessen competition "in any line of com-
merce" (emphasis supplied), it is necessary to examine the effects
of a merger in each such economically significant submarket
to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the merger
will substantially lessen competition.13 5
Applying these tests in the instant case, the Chief Justice concluded
that the relevant lines of commerce were men's, women's, and chil-
dren's shoes since these product lines are recognized by the public,
manufactured in separate plants, have characteristics peculiar to
themselves, and have distinct classes of customers. He refused to
further subdivide the markets by the use of the price/quality and
age/sex distinctions urged by defendants. In reply to Brown's
contention that its medium-priced shoes should not be in the same
market as Kinney's low-priced shoes, the Chief Justice answered
that these two classes competed with each other and the market
boundaries must be drawn "to recognize competition where, in
fact, competition exists." 136 The age/sex distinction was rejected
because the further division would not aid in analyzing the merger's
effects. 1 37 After defining the market the Court went on to find that
the merger violated section 7.13s
135 Id. at 325.
130 Id. at 326.
137 Id. at 327. Brown was arguing that the product markets should be further
subdivided to make infants' and babies' shoes, misses' and children's shoes, and youths'
and boys' shoes each separate lines of commerce. The Court assumed arguendo that
little boys' shoes may have sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to make them
a separate submarket but stated this finer division would not help in analyzing the
merger or be of any advantage to Brown. The two companies produced and sold
approximately the same percentages of the Court's market as they did of the finer
markets urged by Brown.
138 The Court pointed to the fact that there was a significant trend toward
vertical integration in the shoe industry and that Brown had a policy of forcing its
shoes on its retail outlets. It was felt this "may foreclose competition from a sub-
stantial share of the markets . . . without producing any countervailing competi-
tive, economic, or social advantages." For a more detailed discussion of the facts
and analysis of other issues presented see Symposium, "The Meaning and Impact
of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States," 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 153; Notes, 4 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 159 (1963); 31 Fordhan L. Rev. 361 (1962); 10 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 637 (1963). An excellent discussion of the case appears in Barnes, "The Primacy
of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision," 51 Geo. L.J. 706 (1963).
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Mr. Justice Clark, concurring, and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part, felt that a more reasonable
product market would consist of shoes in general. Both Justices
emphasized defining the market from the manufacturer's viewpoint,
Justice Clark emphasizing the marketing aspect and Justice Harlan
the production aspect."'
The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe thus seemed to make the
interchangeability test as developed by the Cellophane case merely
an initial determination in a process of defining the product
market, rather than a complete determination in and of itself.
As Judge Burger stated in Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,140 "It is
now clear [after Brown Shoe] that mere potential interchangeabil-
ity.... may be insufficient to mark the legally pertinent limits of a
'relevant line of commerce.'" 141 It is also apparent that the du
Pont-General Motors test of "peculiar characteristics and uses" was
relegated to being only one of the several factors to be considered in
defining the relevant submarkets.
It can be further argued that the Court recognized and revived
the old production flexibility test as developed by the Columbia
Steel decision. The Court at least recognized this test in determin-
ing the "outer boundaries of a product market" in a vertical merger
case. In a footnote, citing Columbia Steel, the Court stated:
The cross-elasticity of production facilities may also be an import-
ant factor in defining a product market within which a vertical
merger is to be viewed .... However, the District Court made
but limited findings concerning the feasibility of interchanging
equipment in the manufacture of nonrubber footwear. At the
same time, the record supports the court's conclusion that individ-
ual plants generally produced shoes in only one of the product
lines the court found relevant. 142
139 See Comment, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 254, 274 (1965).
140 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
141 Id. at 226. But see Hall, "Market Definition and Antitrust Policy," 20 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 47, 61 (1963). Hall feels that interchangeability may or may not
be sufficient to mark the "legally pertinent limits" of a relevant product market in
future § 7 cases. He feels that market definition is an economic problem and the
relevant product market should be defined as it was by Adelman, "The Antimerger
Act, 1950-1960," 51 Amer. Econ. Rev. 236, 237 (1961), to be the "locus of the supply-
demand forces that determine price." Hall concludes, therefore, that "only one rule
can be valid in any specific case; either some submarket is the locus of the forces
and the functional interchangeability rule is irrelevant or the outer limits encompass
the forces and the peculiar characteristics and uses doctrine [a submarket practical
indicia] does not apply."
142 370 U.S. at 325 n.42. Justice Harlan in his opinion clearly advocated a pro-
duction flexibility test. In contending that the product market should be shoes in
general he emphasizes the fact that shoe manufacturers' can easily shift from one type
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In outlining the practical indicia to be used in delineating the
relevant submarkets, Chief Justice Warren was merely gathering
together factors that had been used or suggested in earlier cases or
Federal Trade Commission decisions involving market determina-
tion. For almost every indicium listed there is a case or decision
which used such a factor in determining a product market before
Brown Shoe.143
The significance of the Brown Shoe decision lies in the Court's
flexible and multi-dimensional approach to product market defini-
tion. Rather than rely on a single test, as was done in the Cellophane
and du Pont-General Motors decisions, the Court enumerated a
number of factors or tests to be considered and attempted to set
out a procedure whereby market determination would be made in
terms of competitive realities. While the case was criticized as
giving the courts unlimited authority to choose a market as they
saw fit,14 4 it was also justified as a reasonable approach to defining
the market by a competitive analysis which allowed the courts to
reject those factors which were not economically relevant to the
of shoe to another. He concludes, "because of this flexibility of manufacture, the
product market with respect to the merger between Brown's manufacturing facilities
and Kinney's retail outlets might more accurately be defined as the complete wearing-
apparel shoe market." Id. at 367 (Harlan, J. dissenting in part and concurring in
part). See note 28 supra.
143 A far from exhaustive list of the cases and decisions which used one of the
"practical indicia" would be as follows:
(1) Public or industry recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962);
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961) ; United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Union Car-
bide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
(2) Peculiar characteristics and uses. United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC,
supra; United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) ; Union Carbide Corp., supra.
(3) Distinct customers. A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, supra.
(4) Distinct prices. Union Carbide Corp., supra.
(5) Sensitivity to price changes. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
For a consideration of each of the indicia and a brief discussion of the cases before
and after Brown Shoe using these indicia see Bock, Mergers and Markets 98-110
(3d ed. 1964).
144 Hall & Phillips, "Antimerger Criteria: Power Concentration, Foreclosure
and Size," 9 Vill. L. Rev. 211 (1964); Lewyn & Mann, "Some Thoughts on Policy
and Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act," 50 A.B.A.J. 154 (1964). (Lewyn
and Mann believe Brown Shoe has given the Justice Department unlimited authority
to pick a market which will reflect the highest percentage of occupancy just because
this is easiest way to win a case).
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situation and to adopt those which were relevant.145 Although both
views were supportable by extension of the Court's decision at the
time of Brown Shoe, subsequent Supreme Court cases have indi-
cated that the fears of those who felt that the courts would have
unlimited discretion in market determination were well-founded.
C. Post-Brown Shoe
Between the time of the Brown Shoe decision and the Alcoa-
Rome Cable and Continental Can decisions, several important cases
concerning the relevant product market were decided. The only
Supreme Court cases decided during this period which shed any
light on product market determination were two bank merger
cases: United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 146 and United
States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington.'47 The
Philadelphia Bank case condemned a bank merger under section 7
of the Clayton Act and the Lexington Bank case condemned such
a merger under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In the Philadelphia Bank case, the Government contended in
the district court that the appropriate lines of commerce were com-
mercial banking, commercial and industrial loans, installment lend-
ing to individuals, single payment loans to individuals, real estate
loans, personal trusts, etc. 48 The Government argued that the
appropriate test was the du Pont-General Motors doctrine of
"peculiar characteristics and uses." The defendants urged the dis-
trict court to follow the Cellophane test of interchangeability
and hold that, since the services of other financial institutions are
interchangeable with those of commercial banks, the relevant prod-
uct market should include the services of all financial institutions.149
The district court, in a decision rendered before Brown Shoe, re-
ferred to the interchangeability and "peculiar characteristics and
uses)) tests as "nothing more than expressions of the same rule in
different language."' 50 Judge Clary felt that if a product had suf-
ficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute it sufficiently
distinct from all other products, then it could not be reasonably
interchanged with such other products. He went on to hold that
commercial banking, viewed collectively, was the relevant product
market and that it had "sufficient peculiar characteristics which
negate reasonable interchangeability." 151 Thus, on the eve of the
145 Barnes, supra note 138, at 710.
146 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
147 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
148 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 361 (1962).
149 Ibid.
150 Id. at 362.
151 Id. at 363.
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Brown Shoe decision a district court was holding that there was
no inconsistency between the two primary, judicially-developed
tests.
After Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court upheld the district
court's determination that commercial banking was the relevant
product market. Mr. Justice Brennan, for the majority, referred
to the fact that the services of commercial banks are distinctive
when compared to those of other financial institutions and that
many of these services are "insulated ... from substitutes furnished
by other institutions." 152 In other words, commercial banking serv-
ices have peculiar characteristics and uses when compared to
the services of other financial institutions, and the services of such
other financial institutions are not reasonably interchangeable
with commercial banking services. Two propositions may thus be
derived from the district and Supreme Court's opinions in the
Philadelphia Bank case:"' first, Brown Shoe did not destroy the
validity of either the reasonable interchangeability test or the
"peculiar characteristics and uses" test; second, the two tests are
not necessarily inconsistent.
Less than one year after the Philadelphia Bank case, the Su-
preme Court again had the opportunity to consider a bank merger
and the relevant product market. This time the charge was a viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.15 4 In the Lexington Bank
case, the Court also held the relevant product market was com-
mercial banking services. In a brief discussion of the market, Jus-
tice Douglas 55 based his determination upon the fact that there
152 374 U.S. at 356.
153 For discussion of the other issues involved in the case see Comment, 62
Ifich. L. Rev. 990 (1964) ; Notes, 1964 Duke LJ. 139; 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 835 (1963);
18 Rutgers L. Rev. 668 (1963) ; 16 Vand. L. Rev. 1217 (1963).
154 The apparent reason that this case was brought under the Sherman Act
rather than under § 7 was because the action was commenced before the decision
in the Philadelphia Bank case and up to that time it was thought that § 7 was not
applicable to bank mergers.
155 Justice Douglas established a rather significant test for judging the validity
of a merger in this Sherman Act case. He held that where the two merging com-
panies "are major competitive factors in a relevant market, the elimination of sig-
nificant competition between them, by merger, itself constitutes a violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act." 376 U.S. at 671-72. Justice Douglas seems to have adopted
a test under which it is easier to show the invalidity of a merger under § 1 than
under § 7 of the Clayton Act where competitive effects outside of the merged com-
panies are determinative. This holding may very well lead to a significant increase
in merger cases brought under the Sherman Act. When the dissent of Douglas con-
demning bigness in Cohonbia Steel is recalled, it is not surprising he has opted for
this new test. See note 22 supra.
For an excellent comparison of the Lexington Bank case and the Columbia Steel
decision, see Note, 53 Ill. B.J. 238 (1964).
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were several characteristics in which commercial banking differed
from other financial institutions. Hence, within a year's time the
Supreme Court was presented with similar factual patterns in a
Sherman Act case and a Clayton Act case and the relevant product
market was held to be identical in the two cases.156
The most significant lower court decision during this period
which applied the Brown Shoe concept to the relevant product
market was Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC.157 Reynolds was charged
with violating section 7 by the purchase of Arrow Brands, Inc.
Reynolds was the world's largest producer of aluminum foil. Arrow
was one of eight companies engaged in converting aluminum foil
and selling it nationally to wholesale florist supply houses. The
relevant market issue was whether the market should be composed
of aluminum foil generally, decorative foil, or florist foil. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission held and the court of appeals agreed that
the relevant line of commerce was florist foil and in this line of
commerce there would be a substantial lessening of competition
by the acquisition.
The court embarked upon a brief discussion of the history of
relevant market definitions and concluded that before Brown Shoe
the "established test" for determining the relevant market necessi-
tated examining the interchangeability of products and the cross-
elasticities of demand between the product and its substitutes.
Judge Burger quoted the Cellophane test as the pre-Brown Shoe
test. It is interesting to note that Judge Burger stated the sup-
posedly Sherman Act test of interchangeability and made no men-
tion of the du Pont-General Motors test of "peculiar characteristics
and uses." In discussing the Cellophane test after Brown Shoe, he
stated:
However, in the very recent case [of] Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States . . . the concepts of interchangeability of use and cross-
elasticity of demand underwent certain important qualifications
and development. It is now clear that mere potential interchange-
ability or cross-elasticity may be insufficient to mark the legally
156 The bank merger problem was also considered by a district court in a § 7
case, United States v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal.
1963). However, the court did not determine the relevant product market for, even
assuming the Government's contention that the market was commercial banking was
correct, the court found no substantial lessening of competition.
157 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Reynolds Metals is selected as an example
of how the lower courts treated the product market concept after Browl; Shoe and
before 1964. For other significant lower court and Federal Trade Commission de-
cisions during this period see United States v. Bliss & Laughlin Inc., 1963 Trade
Cases 1 70, 734 (S.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Brillo Manufacturing Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16,543 (FTC Dkt.
6557, 1963) ; Luria Bros., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 16,183 (FTC Dkt. 6156, 1962).
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pertinent limits of a "relevant line of commerce." The "outer
limits" of a general market may be thus determined, but sharply
distinct submarkets can exist within these outer limits which may
henceforth be the focal point of administrative and judicial in-
quiry under Section 7.158
Applying the Brown Shoe doctrine to the case before him Judge
Burger concluded that florist foil was the relevant line of commerce
because of public and industrial recognition of it as a separate
economic entity, its distinct customers, and its distinct prices. These
three practical indicia as outlined by Brown Shoe allowed the
florist foil market to be separated from aluminum foil markets
generally, and especially from the decorative foil market.
It is evident from the court's opinion that other decorative
foil might have been used interchangeably with florist foil if the
producers and consumers had so desired. Florist foil was held to be
one type of decorative foil. Judge Burger notes there is "little
affirmative basis for assuming any marked difference between the
characteristics of ... florist foil and the remainder ... of decorative
foil .... )) 159 He further concludes:
[O]n the basis of the use and quality of the products displayed
on the record, we would have difficulty in affirming the Commis-
sion's determination that the florist foil converting industry is a
line of commerce distinctly separable from the considerably larger
decorative foil industry viewed in the aggregate. 60
Although there thus appeared to be a good possibility that florist
foil was interchangeable with other decorative foil, the court dis-
missed this possibility because consumers did not actually inter-
change or substitute decorative foil for florist foil or vice versa.
The court thus seemed to establish an actual interchangeability
concept as distinguished from the old reasonable interchangeability
concept.
Reynolds Metals also emphasized "the election of other deco-
rative foil converters not to serve the florist industry" 161 as a factor
in distinguishing florist foil from other decorative foil. It appears
that the producers could shift from producing other decorative
foil to florist foil, but did not do so. This then is a rejection of the
production flexibility concept as developed by the Columbia Steel
decision. The court refused to consider technical possibilities of pro-
duction shifts in the absence of any actual shifts.
158 309 F.2d at 226.
159 Id. at 227-28.
160 Id. at 228.
161 Id. at 229.
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
From the preceding discussion of post-Brown Shoe decisions,
it is evident that Brown Shoe did not fix the definition of the rele-
vant product market. It tried to reconcile the earlier cases and
set up practical guides for the future, and while mainly succeeding
in this objective during this period, the subsequent cases discussed
above indicate there remained great flexibility in defining the rele-
vant product market with each particular factual situation that
arose.
D. 1964-Continental Can and Alcoa-Rome Cable
As the year 1964 approached, the antitrust lawyer had a
wealth of material concerning a definition of the relevant product
market and was busily attempting to fit all of it together. On the
one hand he had the Sherman Act cases which espoused the
reasonable interchangeability test and on the other he had the
"peculiar characteristic and uses" test which was developed pri-
marily under the Clayton Act cases. In addition, he had analyzed
Brown Shoe and found in it an attempt to reconcile the various
tests and provide a workable solution. He also had access to sub-
sequent cases which applied and refined the Brown Shoe doctrine.
As of that date it appeared that while no simple definition of the
relevant product market could be formulated there was a genuine
attempt on the part of the courts to portray as fairly as possible
an economically meaningful area in which to measure the competi-
tive effects of each case. While the definition could result in either
a broad or a narrow product market, the courts did not go to
extremes in either direction. Just as the product market definitions
were beginning to show some semblance of an organized approach,
the Supreme Court delivered its remarkable decisions in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America'"2 and United States v. Con-
tinental Can Company.6 ' The relevant market concept was
stretched to its limit and possibly beyond in both directions-the
Alcoa-Rome Cable case resulting in a narrow product market and
the Continental Can case resulting in an extremely broad one.
In the Alcoa-Rome Cable case, the acquisition by Alcoa of the
stock and assets of the Rome Cable Corporation was challenged
as violating section 7. The important products involved in the
case were aluminum and copper wire and cable. Aluminum and
copper are the only two materials utilized commercially to produce
conductors for the transmission of electricity. There are two kinds
of conductors, bare and insulated. Rome produced both copper
conductor and aluminum conductor, but over 90 per cent of its
production was in insulated copper products. It produced only 0.3
162 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
163 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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per cent of the total industry production of bare aluminum con-
ductor, 4.7 per cent of insulated aluminum conductor and 1.3 per
cent of aluminum conductor (a composite of bare and insulated
aluminum conductor). Alcoa, on the other hand, produced no
copper conductor but controlled large shares of total industry
production in aluminum conductor. It produced 32.5 per cent of the
bare aluminum conductor, 11.6 per cent of insulated aluminum con-
ductor and 27.8 per cent of the broader aluminum conductor line.
Electrical transmission and distribution lines are placed both
overhead and underground. Overhead, aluminum has virtually dis-
placed copper since the lines are bare or not heavily insulated.
Underground, where only heavily insulated conductor is used,
copper is virtually the only conductor utilized.
In the district court, the parties agreed that conductor was
the broad product market and that insulated conductor and
bare aluminum were relevant submarkets.'6 4 Chief Judge Brennan
refused to consider insulated copper and insulated aluminum con-
ductor as separate submarkets, finding that, although there was a
distinct price difference, the two could be produced interchangeably,
were not considered in the industry as two separate economic en-
tities, did not have distinct customers, and were used for the same
purpose by the same customers.165 In other words, the district
court used the practical indicia outlined in Brown Shoe and by
applying them to these products concluded they constituted one
line of commerce. Of the indicia, the market failed to meet only
two, the prices of the products were different and there was not
common sensitivity to price changes. The aluminum conductor line,
composed of bare and insulated aluminum, was held not to consti-
tute a separate line of commerce, since bare and insulated aluminum
were not each separate lines of commerce. Judge Brennan stated:
To find that Item 1 [aluminum conductor] is a line of commerce
extends the outer boundaries of the market beyond its legal limits
because covered [insulated] copper wire and cable is interchange-
able in use and there is cross-elasticity of the demand therefor
between insulated or covered aluminum and copper.16
The district court went on to hold there was no violation of section
7 and dismissed the complaint.
Mr. Justice Douglas, for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower
court. The reason for the reversal was that Justice Douglas rede-
164 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501, 509 (1963).
The Government urged that there were ten separate product markets, of which the
important ones were conductor in general, aluminum conductor, bare aluminum cable,
insulated aluminum wire and cable, and insulated conductor.
165 Ibid.
166 Id. at 510.
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fined the relevant product market and Alcoa's share of such market
was so large as to make the merger presumptively anticompetitive
under the Philadelpkia Bank test.167 This case is an excellent ex-
ample of the result in a section 7 proceeding turning on how the
market is defined.
Justice Douglas found that the relevant product submarket
was aluminum conductor by holding insulated aluminum was a
distinct market from insulated copper and then combining bare
and insulated aluminum into one market. He admitted there was
competition between insulated aluminum and its copper counter-
part, and held this was enough to justify grouping them together
in a single product market. However, this competition was held not
to "preclude their division for purposes of §7 into separate sub-
markets .... ," 168 In making this division Justice Douglas empha-
sized that insulated aluminum was intrinsically inferior to insulated
copper and had little consumer acceptance in most instances, except
in overhead distribution, where it had decisive advantages. He also
relied heavily on the fact that "the price of most insulated aluminum
conductors is . . . only 50 per cent to 65 per cent of the price of
their copper counterparts .... ". 169 It was recognized that there was
some interchangeability between aluminum and copper in certain
uses, such as overhead distribution where "each does the job
equally well." 170 However, the prevailing price differential was held
to be the vital factor in the division of the two insulated conductors
into separate submarkets. Justice Douglas concluded Brown Shoe
was not authority for ignoring price, and in distinguishing the two
cases stated:
A purchaser of shoes buys with an eye to his budget, to style,
and to quality as well as to price. But here, where insulated
aluminum conductor pricewise stands so distinctly apart, to ignore
price in determining the relevant line of commerce is to ignore
the single, most important, practical factor in the business.171
167 The Philadelphia Bank test is that where "a merger... produces a firm con-
trolling an undue percentage share of the relevant market [30%o in the bank merger
case], and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, [it) is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must
be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely
to have such anticompetitive effects." United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). The merger in the instant case would have produced a firm
controlling 29.1% of the relevant product market.
168 377 U.S. at 275.





After Justice Douglas had determined that insulated aluminum
conductor and insulated copper conductor were separable into dis-
tinct lines of commerce, he found little difficulty in combining bare
and insulated aluminum into one market, aluminum conductor.
This combination was justified by one sentence in the opinion and
in a footnote. The sentence reads, "Both types are used for the
purpose of conducting electricity and are sold to the same custom-
ers, electrical utilities." 172 The reasoning of the footnote is that
since the district court found and the parties agreed that bare
aluminum conductor and conductor generally constituted separate
lines of commerce, and since Justice Douglas found insulated
aluminum and insulated copper to be separate markets, then "the
conclusion that aluminum conductor (bare and insulated) is a
line of commerce is a logical extension of the District Court's
findings." 173
It is thus apparent that two significant determinations were
rnade in arriving at aluminum conductor as the relevant product
market. First, Justice Douglas separated insulated aluminum con-
ductor from insulated copper conductor and determined they were
separate lines of commerce. Secondly, he combined bare aluminum
conductor and insulated aluminum conductor into the broader sub-
market of aluminum conductor. Neither determination is econom-
ically convincing, but the first seems easier to justify than the
second. Insulated aluminum was separated from insulated copper
in the face of district court determinations (which Justice Douglas
does not question) that they are not recognized in the industry as
separate entities; that they both perform the same functions and
are generally competitive with each other; that they may be pro-
duced interchangeably using the same facilities; and that there
are no distinct customers or specialized vendors for insulated alu-
minum conductor.174 The district court was thus attempting to
apply the submarket practical indicia as outlined in the Brown
Shoe decision.
The overruling of these determinations was sharply criticized
by Mr. Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Harlan and Goldberg)
in his dissenting opinion. After summarizing the holdings of the
district court, Justice Stewart states:
Yet this Court overrules its decision with little more than a wave
of the hand. On the basis of two assertions, that the record shows
172 Id. at 277.
173 Id. at 277 n.4.
174 214 F. Supp. 501, 509.
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"fabricators of insulated copper conductor are powerless to elim-
inate the price disadvantage under which they labor and thus
can do little to make their product competitive," and that the
difference in price between aluminum and copper conductors is
"the single, most important, practical factor in the business,"
both of which are contrary to the explicit findings of the District
Court, the Court summarily concludes that aluminum conductor
is "for purposes of §7 a line of commerce." 175
Although Justice Douglas did lightly treat the district court's
determinations, he did have on his side the factor of a significant
price differential between insulated aluminum and insulated copper
which tended to make insulated aluminum available for some uses
for which it was not economically feasible to use copper. He seems
to be on solid ground in recognizing that Brown Shoe was not
authority for disregarding price differentials. Although price was
not determinative in Brown Shoe, the Court did state that "distinct
prices" was one of the indicia to be considered. It should also be
noted that both before and after Brown Shoe, several lower courts
and the FTC had emphasized price as being an important factor in
market definition .17 The issue becomes one of balancing a signifi-
cant price differential against several other practical indicia tending
to show the products belong to the same market. This is a matter
of placing emphasis, and both the majority and minority views of
the Court can be supported in this respect.
While the separation of insulated aluminum from insulated
copper may be justified, the combining of bare and insulated alu-
minum into one product market seems questionable. As indicated
above, Justice Douglas supports this combination only by referring
to the fact that both products are used for conducting electricity
and are sold to electrical utilities, and by reasoning that since both
products are separate lines of commerce as distinguished from their
copper counterparts they can be combined into one market. This
reasoning does not seem to be enough to establish a product market
under any previous test. As Justice Stewart points out, all electrical
conductors are used for conducting electricity and are sold to elec-
trical utilities. Insulated copper and bare aluminum are both used
for conducting electricity and are both sold to electrical utilities, but
certainly Justice Douglas would not contend this placed them in
the same relevant market. How then can such reasoning justify
placing bare and insulated aluminum in the same market? In addi-
175 377 U.S. at 284-85 (dissenting opinion).
176 See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, supra note 157; A. G. Spalding &




tion, the mere fact that bare and insulated aluminum are separate
lines of commerce certainly does not justify their inclusion in -a
common market. This combination could have been justified by
showing the products were reasonably interchangeable, or had the
same peculiar characteristics and uses, or were in competition with
each other; however, the Court made no attempt so to justify the
combination and in fact could not have done so. As Justice Stewart
points out in his dissent:
Even the Government does not claim that the tvo are competitive;
different equipment and engineering skills are required for their
manufacture and sale; and as the District Court found, the com-
bination of bare and insulated aluminum conductors is not gen-
erally "recognized in the industry as a separate economic entity"
or sub-market.1 77
In addition, the evidence indicates an almost total lack of inter-
changeability between the two products. Therefore, it is very diffi-
cult to see how bare and insulated aluminum could be combined
into one market on any economically significant basis.
While the Alcoa-Rome Cable case presented a controversial
market definition, an even more controversial definition was pro-
mulgated in the Continental Can case. In 1956 the Continental Can
Company, the second largest producer of metal containers with
thirty-three per cent of the domestic market, acquired all of the
assets of Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, the third largest producer
of glass containers with ten per cent of the domestic market. The
Government charged that the acquisition violated section 7 and
asked for divestiture. Here, as in Alcoa-Rome Cable, the determina-
tion of the relevant market was vital to the outcome of the case.
The district court found the lines of commerce to be metal con-
tainers, glass containers, and metal and glass beer containers and
held that the Government had failed to prove reasonable probabil-
ity of anticompetitive effects in any of the three lines of com-
merce.78 The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, reversed, finding
that the relevant markets consisted of a broad product market
including both glass and metal containers and several end-use
product submarkets, such as containers for the soft drink industry,
the beer industry, and the canning industry. Six firms with 70.1 per
cent of the business would dominate the combined metal and glass
container product market. Continental would rank second, and
Hazel-Atlas sixth, and the share of the combined firm would be
twenty-five per cent. The Court held such a combination in a
highly concentrated industry might substantially lessen competition.
7 377 U.S. at 286 (dissenting opinion).
178 United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 806 (1963).
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Production in both the glass and can industries is highly con-
centrated and dominated by a few firms. Continental produced no
glass containers and Hazel-Atlas produced no cans. Continental
also produced plastic containers, but Hazel-Atlas did not.
In the district court, the defendants contended that the metal
container industry and the glass container industry were each
separate lines of commerce. In addition to these lines of commerce,
the Government proposed a broad packaging industry market and
seven submarkets including containers for the beer industry, con-
tainers for the soft drink industry, containers for the canning indus-
try, containers for the toiletries and cosmetic industry, containers
for the medicine and health industry, and containers for the house-
hold and chemical industry.179 The Government made no contention
that the combined can and glass industry was a relevant line of
commerce. The Government sought to include within its packaging
industry metal cans, glass containers, glassware, corrugated ship-
ping cartons, steel pails, and plastic containers. In denying that
this wide range of products constituted a relevant line of commerce,
the district court stated that the broadest use of the reasonable
interchangeability and "cross-elasticity of demand" test "could not
possibly encompass this wide diversity of products." 180 In denying
submarket treatment to all end-use containers categories, except
beer containers, the court found they did not meet the practical
indicia of Brown Shoe and included diverse products which were
not interchangeable.
In reversing the district court and redefining the product
markets to include the combined glass and metal container indus-
tries and all end uses for which they compete, Justice White, for
the Court, relied almost exclusively on the proposition that one
"must recognize meaningful competition where it is found to
exist." 181 He may even have gone so far as to conclude, as the
dissent contends he does, "that whenever 'meaningful competition'
exists, a 'line of commerce' is to be found." 182 Justice White ad-
mitted that glass and metal containers have different characteristics
and uses; that the machinery necessary to pack in glass and in cans
is different; that particular users of can or glass may pack in only
one container and not shift from time to time "as price and other
factors might make desirable"; and that interindustry competition
between metal and glass containers is different from the intraindus-
try competition between the metal container companies and the
179 Id. at 778-79.
180 Id. at 788.
181 378 U.S. at 449.
182 Id. at 468 (dissenting opinion).
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intraindustry competition between the glass companies.1 8 3 How-
ever, he concluded that while these factors were "relevant and
important considerations" they were "not sufficient to obscure the
competitive relationships" which the record "so compellingly" re-
vealed. 84 It was also noted that price differentials might exist
between the two products and that the demand for one might not
be responsive to price changes of the other, but Justice White
referred to these factors as "relevant matters but not determinative
of the product market issue." 15 The real test was "the existence
of a large area of effective competition between the makers of cans
and the makers of glass containers." 186
As indicated above, not even the Government contended that
the combined glass and metal container industries should be a
separate relevant product market. However, this did not deter Jus-
tice White: he concluded that there was nothing to prevent the
Court "from reaching the question of its prima facie existence at
this stage of the case." 187 It is interesting to note here that he
referred to the "prima facie existence" of this line of commerce.
Justice Goldberg concurred in the decision on the ground that the
Court was only holding there was a prima facie inference that
glass and metal containers were in the same market and that on
remand the defendants could rebut this inference.
One of the most difficult arguments which had to be met was
that the combined metal and glass containers line of commerce
disregarded other containers competing for the same business, such
as plastic, paper, and foil. Justice White sought to meet this argu-
ment under a Brown Shoe approach which would classify cans and
glass together as a "well-defined submarket" existing within the
broader market of metal, glass, and other competing containers. It is
very difficult to conceive how metal and glass containers can be a
"well-defined submarket" under the practical indicia of Brown
Shoe. In a bitter dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice
Stewart, accuses the Court of using Brown Shoe as a "bootstrap." 188
This criticism seems well deserved since the practical indicia of
Brown Shoe provide no basis for separating metal and glass from
plastic and other containers. When compared with other containers,
metal and glass together are certainly not recognized as a separate
economic entity and they do not possess peculiar characteristics
183 Id. at 450.
184 Ibid.
185 Id. at 455.
180 Id. at 456.
187 Id. at 457.
18S Id. at 472 (dissenting opinion).
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and uses, distinct customers, or distinct prices. As Justice Harlan
points out:
While many of these factors weigh against the Court's conclusion
that metal and glass containers should be combined in a single
line of commerce, not one of them speaks for the Court's con-
clusion that they should be segregated from all other containers
and together form a separate line of commerce.189
When analyzing the market definition approach taken in
Continental Can in light of the previous tests promulgated by the
Supreme Court, it seems that a new test has been adopted. The
Court definitely did not follow the old guard "peculiar characteris-
tics and uses" test as developed by du Pont-General Motors and
refined by Brown Shoe. The Court admitted that "glass and metal
containers have different characteristics which may disqualify one
or the other ... from this or that particular use. .. ." 190 It is also
apparent, as indicated above, that the Court did not adhere to the
practical indicia concepts of a submarket as outlined in Brown
Shoe. These indicia do not justify the combination of metal and
glass containers into one submarket, nor do they provide a basis
for separating glass and metal containers from other containers. A
plausible argument can be made that what the Court did was to
pick up the old Sherman Act test of reasonable interchangeability
and cross-elasticity of demand and stretch it to its limits-even
further than it was stretched in the often criticized Cellophane case.
Mr. Justice White may have indicated that he was doing just this
when he stated:
Though the interchangeability of use may not be so complete and
the cross-elasticity of demand not so immediate as in the case of
most intraindustry mergers, there is over the long run the kind
of customer response to innovation and other competitive stimuli
that brings the competition between these two industries within
§7's competition-preserving proscriptions.191
However, rather than accuse the Court of readopting and broad-
ening the old reasonable interchangeability test, it seems more
reasonable to suggest that the Court has adopted a new approach.
189 Id. at 472 n.8 (dissenting opinion). It should be noted here that the probable
reason the Court did not consider plastic and other containers was because of lack
of evidence. If Mr. Justice Goldberg is right in concluding that the Court has not
finally decided the relevant line of commerce, then on remand the district court may
be able to include plastic and other containers in the product market if the evidence
so warrants. Even if this be the case, the Court's talk about metal and glass con-
tainers being a "well-defined" submarket is very questionable.
190 Id. at 450.
191 Id. at 455.
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The Court examined the record for evidence of competition between
metal and glass containers, found such competition existed and
would be substantially lessened by the acquisition in question, and
then defined the relevant product market so as to reflect the pro-
jected anticompetitive effects. In other words, the Court has
adopted a result-oriented approach and whether or not this "reads
the 'line of commerce' element out of §7" as Justice Harlan sug-
gests,'92 will remain for future cases to decide.
In examining the Alcoa-Rome Cable and Continental Can
cases together, what conclusions can be suggested? First of all there
seems to be a rather significantly different approach taken by the
Court in the two cases. In Alcoa-Rome Cable, there was an acquisi-
tion by an aluminum company of an essentially copper-producing
company. While recognizing that competition exists between copper
and aluminum, the Court defined the product market narrowly to
include only aluminum conductor. In Continental Can, there was
an acquisition by a can company of a glass company and the Court
broadly defined the market to include both metal and glass con-
tainers. The Court also emphasized different factors as being
determinative of the relevant market in the two cases. The Court
in Alcoa-Rome Cable, when separating insulated aluminum from
insulated copper, recognized that competition existed between the
two products, but separated them on the basis of price differentials.
On the other hand, in Continental Can, when combining metal and
glass containers, the Court recognized price differentials existed, but
combined the products because they were highly competitive.
These inconsistencies indicate that the Court did not follow
the same market definition in the two cases. While price differentials
were emphasized in Alcoa-Rome Cable, competition was the test in
Continental Can. As previously shown, in neither case did the
Court stick to the earlier tests as developed from the du Pont cases
through Brown Shoe. What the Court appears to have done in both
instances was to determine that there had been a violation of section
7 and then define the product markets in terms of this intuitive
conclusion.
It is not the purpose of this paper to indicate whether or not
the results reached in Alcoa-Rome Cable and Continental Can are
justifiable. The 1950 amendment of section 7 was intended to cope
with monopolistic tendencies "in their incipiency and well before
they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act
proceeding." '11 It is directed against economic concentration, and
when two companies in highly concentrated industries merge (Con-
192 Id. at 468 (dissenting opinion).
193 S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); see also H.R. Rep. No.
1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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tinental Can) or when the leader in a concentrated industry with a
history of mergers acquires a competitor (Alcoa), there is a good
possibility that section 7 has been violated. However, in reaching
possibly justifiable decisions, the Court has disregarded a carefully
articulated market definition. The market is formulated only after
the illegality of the acquisition has been determined and the reasons
given to support the market delineation are inadequate and un-
convincing. It may be that the Court is suggesting a per se rule
that mergers between large corporations which are or may be
competitors violate section 7. If such a rule is to be adopted, once
actual or potential competition is shown, there will be no need to
define the relevant market.
It is significant to note that in both of these cases the Court
defined the product markets in terms which brought the mergers
into the conventional horizontal merger category. It would seem
that both of these mergers, especially the one in Continental Can,
could be classified as conglomerate. The Court's approach in this
respect may be an attempt to disguise its apparent philosophy that
bigness is bad, since if these cases were treated as conglomerate
mergers, power solely in the financial sense would be what was
being condemned.'9 By treating these mergers as horizontal and
by redefining the market to fit its purposes the Court has been
able to portray that picture of power and lessening of competition in
a line of commerce which the language of section 7 requires.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE MARKET DEFINITION UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT AND THE CLAYTON ACT
One of the most debated issues in this area is whether or not
the market tests under the Sherman Act are the same as those under
the Clayton Act. The writers on this issue are divided into two
groups: those who suggest the tests are different, relying mainly
on the alleged inconsistencies between the two du Pont cases,19 and
those who suggest the tests are the same under both acts.""6
194 For a detailed discussion of conglomerate mergers and the problem of bigness
see Day, "Conglomerate Mergers and 'The Curse of Bigness,"' 42 N.C.L. Rev. 511
(1964).
195 See, e.g., Bock, Mergers and Markets 87 (3d ed. 1964); Hall & Phillips,
Bank Mergers & Regulatory Agencies (Appendix B) 239-55 (1964); Dirlam &
Stelzer, "The Du Pont-General Motors Decision: In the Antitrust Grain," 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 24, 40 (1958) ; Comment, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev .861, 875 (1962).
196 See, e.g., Adelman, "Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion," 45 Va.
L. Rev. 684, 689 (1959) ; Barnes, "The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe
Decision," 51 Geo. L.J. 706, 728 (1963); Hall, "Market Definition and Antitrust
Policy," 20 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 47 (1963); Handler, "Fifteenth Annual Review of
Antitrust Developments," 17 The Record 411, 434-35 (1962); Handler & Robinson,
"A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61 Colum.
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In contending that the two tests are different, one would begin
with a comparison of the du Pont-General Motors and the du Pont-
Cellophane cases. We have seen that the Cellophane Sherman Act
case developed the reasonable interchangeability test, while the
General Motors Clayton Act case espoused the "peculiar character-
istics and uses" theory. In Cellophane the reasonable interchange-
ability test resulted in a very broad market, while in du Pont-
General Motors the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test resulted
in a narrow market. Since these cases were only a year apart and
the majority in General Motors failed to cite Cellophane, while the
dissent relied upon it, it might seem that two different tests were
developed by these two cases.
The major case authority that there are two distinct tests
comes from the Bethlehem Steel case. Judge Weinfeld stated, "there
can be a substantial lessening of competition with respect to a
product whether or not there are reasonably interchangeable sub-
stitutes." 1'T This was a section 7 case and the court seemed to
reject the reasonable interchangeability test. However, it must
be remembered that the court did look for substitutes and found
none to exist. A similar case was the Crown Zellerbach case where
the court of appeals in the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the
Cellophane case to a section 7 acquisition. In referring to Cellophane
and section 2 of the Sherman Act the court stated, "The problem
which arises in a case involving §7 of the Clayton Act is a very
different one." 198 It was also true there, however, as it was in the
Bethlehem case, that the court found no substitutes to be present
for the relevant product.
Those who contend there are separate tests for each act usually
so contend because of a belief that there are inherent differences in
the acts. 9' The argument runs as follows:
The Sherman Act is aimed at accomplished conditions: the Cel-
lophane charge was that monopolization had taken place. The
Clayton Act is aimed at curtailing incipient monopolistic forces:
the du Pont-General Motors charge was that the relationship
would probably tend to lessen competition or create a monopoly.
Accordingly, a Clayton Act charge that is aimed at incipiency
may make it appropriate to follow a narrower concept of the
market than a Sherman Act case.20
L. Rev. 629, 643 (1961) ; Hogan & Koeble, "Determination of the Market for Anti-
trust Purposes: Difficulties and Problems," 39 U. Det. L.J. 519 (1962).
197 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 593 n.36 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
198 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1961).
19 See Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 195, at 40; Comment, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev.
861 (1962).
200 Massel, Competition and Monopoly 273-74 (1962).
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Although there is authority to the contrary, the better view
today seems to be that there is no basic difference between the
test applied in the Sherman Act cases and the one applied in the
Clayton Act cases.2 ' It is quite possible that if the Cellophane and
du Pont-General Motors cases were examined in a vacuum one
would conclude there were separate tests applied under the two acts.
However, the recent case trend has been away from such a
distinction.
The Supreme Court suggested in International Boxing Club 20 2
that the market definition was the same under both acts. The Court
in that case (a section 2 case) applied the Cellophane test of rea-
sonable interchangeability to establish a narrow product market
consisting of championship boxing contests as distinguished from
boxing contests in general. Moreover, it stated that "by analogy,"
championship boxing "bears those sufficiently 'peculiar characteris-
tics' found in automobile fabrics and finishes such as to bring them
within the Clayton Act's 'line of commerce.' "203 Hence, the Su-
preme Court was recognizing that the market would be the same
under either test. It should also be remembered here that a signifi-
cant change in Court membership occurred between the time of
the Cellophane decision and International Boxing Club.0 4 The new
Court may have been indicating that the Sherman Act test was to
become an easier one for the Government to meet, as the Court was
indicating in the cases involving the Clayton Act test subsequent to
the Cellophane decision. In other words, the Sherman Act test as
applied in Cellophane was being changed to correspond to the pre-
vailing "peculiar characteristics and uses" test as developed under
the Clayton Act.
A significant lower court case during this period which indi-
cated the tests were the same under both acts was United States v.
Columbia Picture Corp.05 In rejecting the Government's argument
that there was a violation of section 7, Judge Herlands commented
on the interchangeability and "peculiar characteristics and uses"
tests as follows:
To determine whether or not there is a reasonable probability of
a substantial lessening of competition, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act demands an examination into economic realities. All competi-
tion must be considered, including competition faced by the prod-
uct in question from other products.
201 See note 196 supra.
202 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
203 Id. at 252 n.8.
204 See note 60 supra.
205 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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The tests enunciated by the authorities are consistent. Effectively,
the test "reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which
(the products) are produced-price, use and qualities considered,"
[citing Cellophane] and the test "sufficient peculiar character-
istics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct...
to make them a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of the
Clayton Act" [citing General Motors] are but different verbaliza-
tions of the same criterion.
They require the same accumulation and scrutiny of facts and ap-
plication of judgment. The task is to find the area of effective
competition. The "characteristics and uses" formulation does not
limit the court's inquiry to physical attributes and foreclose in-
quiry into the competitive situation.
20 6
Thus, the district court equated the two standard tests that were
once thought to be distinct. As noted above the district court in
the Philadelphia Bank case also held the two tests to be identical
as Judge Clary stated that they were "nothing more than expres-
sions of the same rule in different language." 207 That court's market
determination was then affirmed by the Supreme Court.
This recent case trend, indicating that the test for market
definition is essentially the same under the Clayton and Sherman
Acts, was not altered by the Brown Shoe decision.208 The Court
recognized both reasonable interchangeability and peculiar char-
acteristics and uses in analyzing a section 7 acquisition. It merely
allocated "interchangeability" to determine the outer limits of the
product market and the "peculiar characteristics and uses" to a
position among the practical indicia for determining submarkets.
That this may result in the courts' emphasizing "peculiar charac-
teristics and uses" since a submarket determination will usually be
more vital than a broad market determination (as was the case in
200 Id. at 183-84. [The court's footnotes are omitted.]
207 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 362 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
208 One noted author cites Brown Shoe for the proposition that the two acts
have the same tests. Writing before Brown Shoe, Professor Milton Handler stated,
"The legal test governing product market definition is essentially the same under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts." Handler & Robinson, supra note 196, at 643. After
Brown Shoe, the same author concluded in analyzing the case that
One of the burning issues in the pre-Brown Shoe era . . . was whether the
relevant product market varied with the nature of the antitrust complaint.
We now have the answer. Markets are defined "for antitrust purposes" gen-
erally. They are not defined differently under Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In either event there may be an outer
market and one or more inner submarkets within which competitive effects
are to be appraised.
Handler, supra note 196, at 434-35.
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Reynolds Metals) is no support for the contention that Brown Shoe
has reemphasized the supposed Sherman and Clayton test distinc-
tions. This is especially true when one recalls that in 1964 the
Court used "peculiar characteristics and uses" language in a Sher-
man Act case (Lexington Bank) and talked extensively about
interchangeability in a Clayton Act case (Continental Can). The
results seem to be the same no matter which language is used. All
the Court did in Brown Shoe was to recognize that no one test is
controlling, but that several factors are necessary to a true market
determination. 2
0 9
In 1964 the Supreme Court removed any doubt about dif-
ferent market tests under the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act
as far as section 1 of the Sherman Act is concerned. In the Lexing-
ton Bank case the Court applied to section 1 the same market test
that was applied to an almost identical factual situation presented
one year earlier under the section 7 Philadelphia Bank case. Both
cases involved bank mergers and both held commercial banking
services to be the relevant product market in the face of strong
contentions by the defendants that the product market should be
the services of all financial institutions. Not only was the market
definition under section 1 held to be uniform with that under sec-
tion 7, but the incipiency doctrine and the anti-bigness concept of
section 7 were brought across into section 1 through the declaration
of a new test of illegality by Justice Douglas whereby a violation
will occur when the two merging firms are major competitive factors
in the market and the merger will substantially lessen competition
between them.2 10
As indicated above, a major argument of those claiming a dif-
ference in tests under section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of
the Sherman Act is that under section 2 accomplished conditions
must be shown, while only an incipient condition is needed under
section 7. However, this should not necessarily result in a different
approach to market determination. It is only after the market has
been determined that the differences in the two acts become im-
portant, i.e., in determining the degree of control or power in the
market that is necessary to constitute a violation.
209 It should be noted here that before Brown Shoe the district court in the
Philadelphia National Bank case had determined a relevant product market after de-
ciding that no difference existed between "reasonable interchangeability" and "peculiar
characteristics and uses." Supra note 207. After Brown Shoe the Supreme Court upheld
this product market determination. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1962).
210 See note 155 supra.
211 See Hall, supra note 196, at 62.
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In summary, it is apparent that since the Cellophane decision
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have tended to treat
the market definition as involving the same considerations regard-
less of whether a Sherman Act or Clayton Act violation is the
charge. -12 The International Boxing Club case brought the Cello-
phane test into line with the du Pont-General Motors test and
since that time the supposed distinction between the two tests has
disappeared. The market may be drawn broadly or narrowly under
either act and a case-by-case study supports the conclusion that
the supposed Clayton Act test of "peculiar characteristics and
uses" and the supposed Sherman Act test of "reasonable inter-
changeability" are "but different verbalizations of the same cri-
terion."213 As far as mergers are concerned, the Lexington Bank
case conclusively establishes that the market definition will be the
same under both acts. The two recent cases of Continental Can and
Alcoa-Rome Cable do not indicate any departure from the recent
trend of uniform market treatment under the acts but rather are
indicative of the Supreme Court's recent result-oriented approach
to market definition.
V. CONCLUSION
Ever since the relevant product market problem became im-
portant in 1948 with the Columbia Steel decision the Supreme
Court has been struggling to develop proper tests for market de-
termination. During the period from 1948 to 1959 the Court at-
tempted to define the market in terms of a single test such as
"production flexibility," "peculiar characteristics and uses," or
"reasonable interchangeability." This led to a period of hopeless
confusion in the lower courts which was characterized by some
courts adopting one test, some adopting another, and still others
adopting a combination of the tests. In 1962 the Court in the
Brown Shoe decision made a valiant attempt to provide a workable
solution for determining the product market. It abandoned the old
single-formula approach by bringing together the various market
212 Further support for this view can be obtained from a recent case involving
§ 3 of the Clayton Act. In Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961), a product market determination was held to be important under § 3. See
note 14 supra. In holding that the product market under § 3 had to be found "on
the basis of the facts peculiar to the case," the Sherman Act case of International
Boxing Club was cited as authority. In addition, another Sherman Act case, Columbia
Steel, was discussed in determining the geographic market. See Handler & Robin-
son, supra note 196, at 646 n.100.
213 United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
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tests and molding them into a new multi-dimensional test. No
longer was there to be one key definition, but the courts were to
be given a chance to examine all of the factors that were relevant
to a particular factual situation. The true purpose of the relevant
market is to define the area of effective competition within which
the alleged anticompetitive effects of the transaction may be
judged. The flexible Brown Shoe formula seemed to be an appropri-
ate approach for such an economic determination.
Although Brown Shoe could have been viewed as a practical
guide to market determination in 1962, its present usefulness for
that purpose is negligible. In both the Continental Can and Alcoa-
Rome Cable cases the district courts had conducted detailed and
extensive examinations of the product markets and had religiously
applied the practical indicia of Brown Shoe. However, the Su-
preme Court dismissed these determinations "with little more than
a wave of the hand" 21 4 and established its own markets and sub-
markets, which often ignored the Brown Shoe tests. If Brown Shoe
has any significance left after these two cases it is in providing the
Court with a stepping stone for unlimited authority in choosing a
product market.215
This recent market approach by the Supreme Court seems to
go hand-in-hand with its recent philosophy of anti-bigness. Begin-
ning with the Philadelphia Bank case the Court has been tending
toward the adoption of a per se doctrine condemning any acquisi-
tion by a big firm in a concentrated industry. During this emphasis
on the "curse of bigness" an economically meaningful market de-
termination has suffered considerably. When the Court is presented
with an acquisition in a concentrated industry by a large company,
it seems to predetermine the illegality of the transaction and then
define the product market in terms which will show the greatest
degree of market control.216 This "gerrymandering of the market
makes a mockery of the assertion that 'determination of the rel-
214 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 284 (1964) (dis-
senting opinion).
215 It was suggested that Brown Shoe gave the courts such authority even before
the Alcoa-Rome Cable and Continental Can cases. See Hall & Phillips, "Antimerger
Criteria: Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and Size," 9 Vill. L Rev. 211, 219
(1964).
216 Cf. Steele, "A Decade of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 14 Vand.
L. Rev. 1049 (1961). Steele concludes that "the disappearance of a fair-sized com-
petitor from the industry as a whole... is a factor to which great weight is given
in today's practical anti-trust world. If that is present, lines of commerce in which
competition may be adversely affected will be found." Id. at 1062.
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evant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of
the Clayton Act.' "21-7
As noted above, the legislative purpose of section 7 was to
curb anticompetitive tendencies in their incipiency and the Court's
recent attack on bigness may be justified in terms of this social
purpose. However, in carrying out this legislative aim the Court
has controverted the express wording of section 7. The language of
section 7 precludes the finding of a violation until there is a finding
of the forbidden anticompetitive effects in a "line of commerce."
The Court's approach of determining anticompetitive effects and
then defining the market, when combined with its anti-bigness
philosophy could lead to disastrous consequences. Conceivably a
merger between the smallest of firms could be condemned under
such an approach. Any merger is a trend toward bigness, especially
if there are other mergers being consummated within the industry or
if the industry is already somewhat concentrated. It would also
always be possible for the Court so to define the market to en-
compass some small area where competition would be lessened.
Hence, the Court could decide this was a trend toward bigness and
then gerrymander the market boundaries around a small segment
of the commerce involved to show a lessening of competition. It is
hoped that when the Court is presented with a merger not involv-
ing a giant of the industry it will return to an economically signif-
icant market determination within the framework of the Brown
Shoe decision which will give the merger a fair chance of survival.
Otherwise all mergers except those involving failing companies
will fall under the unreasoning axe of anti-bigness.
Robert W. Werth.
217 Handler & Robinson, supra note 196, at 650. These authors also point out
that some of the blame for this recent market approach should be placed on the
Department of Justice. They conclude:
Government trial counsel of late have been increasingly frank about their
manipulations of market data. In one case, when it suits their purpose to
narrow the market, they will argue that the doctrine of reasonable inter-
changeability is immaterial. In another, when they desire to broaden the
market to transmute what appears to be a conglomerate diversification into
a horizontal acquisition between competitors, they do not hesitate to rely on
the very same doctrine.
Id. at 649. For another article criticizing the Government's approach in this respect
see Lewyn & Mann, "Some Thoughts on Policy and Enforcement of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act," 50 A.B.A.J. 154 (1964). Those authors state, "The fact is that
the Government has not been averse to shifting its market theories from case to case,
seemingly with little justification other than making the relevant percentages more
favorable to its cause." Id. at 156.
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